Categories
History

Bibliography and Sources

Primary Sources

Imperial War Museum, London
Scrapbooks entitled ‘Ministry of Information’, kept by E. Embleton, 1939- 1946, containing various newspaper clippings (many unsourced and undated).

Collection of newspaper cuttings entitled ‘ATS Glamour Girl, History 1939-85’ by Abram Games OBE, RDI.

Selection of original posters

Mass Observation Archives, University of Sussex
Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942]

FR 1, ‘Channels of Publicity’, 11/10/39

FR 2, ‘Government Posters in Wartime’, October 1939

FR 74, ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster, 16/04/40

FR 442, ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ slogan, October 1940

FR 800, ‘Gas mask posters’, 21/07/41

FR 853, ‘The Technique of Gallup Polls’, 30/08/41

FR 1020, ‘Reviews of Home Propaganda by M-O: from Art and Industry, Vol. 32’, January 1942

FR 2442, Directive and Bulletin: New Series No 4, Merry and Black: reactions to the ‘Black Widow’ poster on road safety, December 1946

TC, Posters: Box 1 ‘Government Poster Survey 1939’

File A: ‘Memos and Comments’ September – November 1939
File C: ‘Government posters in wartime’ October 1939
File E: ‘Extra information post-survey’ 1939-1940

Box 2: ‘Surveys of particular Government posters 1939-1941’

File B: ‘Keep it Dark’ poster survey’ October 1939
File C: ‘Anti-gossip posters’ 1939-1940
File D: ‘Grab, Grab, Grab poster’ April 1940
File E: ‘Gas mask posters’ August 1941
File G: ‘Miscellaneous’ 1941

Box 4: ‘Various poster surveys: Government and Commercial’ 1939-1943

File A: ‘Poster survey’ 1939-1943
File C: ‘Red Army poster’ August 1941

Selection of original posters

Public Record Office, Kew (Now The National Archives)
Ministry of Information
INF 1/ Ministry of Information Files of Correspondence

INF 2/ Guard Books and Related Unregistered Papers

INF 3/ Ministry of Information Original Art Work

INF 13/ Posters and Publications (Selection)

Ministry of Agriculture
MAF 59/ Woman’s Land Army

Secondary Sources

Addison, P. The Road to 1945 (Quartet, London) 1975

Balfour, M. Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) 1979

Begley, G. Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War (Lemon Tree Press, London) 1975

Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Politics and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (Edward Arnold, London) 1990

Boehm, E. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda (Wellfleet, New Jersey) 1989

Briggs, A. The War of Words: A History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom Vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 1970

Briggs, S. Keep Smiling Through (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London) 1975

Brown, J.A.C. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing (Penguin, Middlesex) 1963

Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945 (Pimlico, London) 1969

Calder, A. and Sheridan, D. Speak for Yourself: A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937-49 (Jonathan Cape, London) 1984

Campbell, J. (ed) The Experience of World War Two (Grange Books, London) 1994

Cantwell, J.D. Images of War: British Posters 1939-45 (HMSO, London) 1989

——- The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (HMSO, London) 1993

Catterall, P Britain 1918-1951 ( Heinemann, Oxford) 1994

Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain (B.T. Batsford, London) 1972

Collier, P.F. Collier’s Encyclopaedia (CDRom) 1996

Costello, J. Love, Sex and War 1939-1945 (Pan Books, London) 1985

Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. (Imperial War Museum) Second World War Posters (HMSO, London) 1972

Davies, J. The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45 (BBC, London) 1993

Dear, I.C.B. The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 1995

Felton, M. Civilian Supplies in Wartime Britain (Ministry of Information, England) 1945 (Reprinted 1997 by Imperial War Museum)

Fowler, S. ‘The Nation’s Memory’ in Martin, A.M. (ed) Despatches: the Magazine of the Friends of the Imperial War Museum, April 1997, pp4-7

Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45 (Methuen, London) 1946

Freeman, R.A. Britain at War (Arms and Armour Press, London) 1990

Funk and Wagnalls Corporation Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia (CDRom) 1995

Gallup, G.H. The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937-1975 Vol. 1: 1937-1964 (Random House, New York) 1976

Gaskell, I. ‘History of Images’ in Burke, P. (ed) New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Polity Press, Cambridge) 1991

Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War (Manchester University Press, Manchester) 1996

Gubar, S. ‘”This Is My Rifle, This Is My Gun”: World War Two and the Blitz on Women’ in Higonnet, M.R., Jenson, J., Michel, S. and Weitz, M.C. (eds) Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (Yale University Press, London) 1987

Harper, P. War, Revolution and Peace, Propaganda Posters from the Hoover Institution Archives 1914-1945 [Stanford Art Department, Stanford Museum] [1969]

Harrisson, T. Living Through the Blitz (Penguin, Hammondsworth) 1976

Haskell, F. History and its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past (Yale University Press, London) 1993

Hillier, B. Posters (Spring Books, London) 1969

H.M.S.O. Persuading the People (HMSO, London) 1995

Hollis, R. Graphic Design: A Concise History (Thames and Hudson, London) 1994

Howlett, P. Fighting with Figures: A statistical digest of the Second World War (HMSO, London) 1995

Hunt, J. and Watson, S. Britain and the Two World Wars (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1990

Jowett, G. and O’Donnell, V. Propaganda and Persuasion (Sage, London) 1987

Kostelanetz, R. (ed) Moholy-Nagy (Allen Lane, London) 1970

Kress, G. and Van Leeuwen, T. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design (Routledge, London) 1996

INDEX The Spirit of Wartime (Orbis, Kettering) 1995

Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema (Princeton University Press, Oxford) 1991

Lewis, P. A People’s War (Thames Methuen, London) 1986

Lissitsky, K. El Lissitsky (Thames and Hudson, London) 1968

Longmate, N. How We Lived Then (Arrow Books, London) 1977

Lysaght, C.E. Brendan Bracken (Allen Lane, London) 1979

Marshall Cavendish Collection, ‘Selling the War’ in Images of War No.64 (Marshall Cavendish, London) 1996

Marwick, A. The Nature of History (MacMillan, Basingstoke) 1989

McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two (George Allen and Unwin, London) 1979

McQuiston, L. Graphic Agitation (Phaidon Press, London) 1993

Meggs, P.B. Type and Image: The Language of Graphic Design (Von Nostrand Reinhold, London) 1989

Mercer, D. (ed.) Chronicle of the Second World War (Longman, Harlow) 1990

Nelson, D. The Posters that won the war: The Production, Recruitment and War Bond Posters of World War II (Motorbooks, Wisconsin) 1991

Opie, R. The Wartime Scrapbook: from Blitz to Victory (New Cavendish Books, London) 1995

Paret, P., Lewis, B.I., and Paret, P. Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution (Princeton University Press, New Jersey) 1992

Pearce, M. and Stewart, G. British Political History 1867-1990 (Routledge, London) 1992

Pope, R. War and Society in Britain (Longman, London) 1991

Richards, J. and Sheridan, D. (eds) Mass-Observation at the Movies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) 1987

Rickards, M. The Rise and Fall of the Poster (David and Charles, Newton Abbot) 1971

Samuel, R. (ed) Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, Vol. III: National Fictions (Routledge, London) 1989

Smith, M. British Politics, Society and State Since the Late Nineteenth Century (MacMillan, Basingstoke) 1990

Stevenson, J. British Society 1914-45 (Penguin, London) 1984

Taylor, P.M. The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 1981

Thompson, P. and Davenport, P. The Dictionary of Visual Language (Bogstom & Boyle Books, Ltd., London) 1980

Tinkler, P. Constructing Girlhood: Popular Magazines for Girls Growing up in England 1920-1950 (Taylor and Francis, London) 1995

Weight, R. ‘State, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45’, Historical Research, Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, pp83-101

Weill, A. The Poster (Sotheby’s, London) 1985

Willett, J. The Weimar Years: a culture cut short (Thames and Hudson, London) 1984

Zemen, Z. Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II (Orbis, London) 1978

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

Lewis, R.M., ‘Bibliography & Sources, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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History

Conclusion

This study of the administrative context, content, and reception of these posters allows us to make a number of conclusions on the issue of World War II propaganda. These relate to the way that the government appeared not to have learnt any lessons from the First World War, although over the course of the war appeared to learn from its own failures. The government learnt to listen to the people, although they still seemed to be rather over-optimistic about how much posters could achieve.

When the MoI was set up, it appears to have been regarded as very unimportant by many of those in a position to influence it, although this seems to have changed later when attempts were made to recall advertising experts. The MoI seemed largely to model itself upon First World War experiences, with little regard for the cultural changes in the intervening twenty years, partly because there had been no MoI in those years. After the First World War, the MoI had been disbanded far too quickly, and it appears that the government intended to repeat this mistake as ministers, including Bracken, did not seem to appreciate the range of roles that the MoI could encompass.

It remains difficult to generalise about government posters as a large number were produced. For instance, initially, the MoI appeared to rely largely upon dull and wordy First World War examples, but soon seemed to realise that these were not appropriate for the Second World War. However, one cannot say that the MoI did not produce purely ‘word’ posters after the first failures, as it is possible that these simply did not survive as people did not think them worth saving.

From the start of the war the MoI had to decide “whether to exhort the population to take the action desired by the Government or to focus publicity on explaining and backing up government measures” [Footnote 1]. To begin with, exhortation was the preferred method, but it was realised that “exhortations are useless without commands; commands are useless without organisation” [Footnote 2] and such methods had largely been abandoned by July 1940 [Footnote 3].

An impression which is echoed in a contemporary Fougasse cartoon (Figure 63) is that

In the absence of a smoothly functioning intelligence division the Ministry adopted the blunderbuss technique of domestic propaganda, firing as much material as possible in the hope of hitting something [Footnote 4].

The cartoon, reproduced in a newspaper article, complained that one could not tell what the government wished the people to do, as one could not tell the essential instructions from the peripheral, less urgent, campaigns. Peace-time department stores usually devoted its entire advertising to a single sales message, “It did not confuse the issue by including … exhortations to buy the wares of a dozen different other departments.” [Footnote 5]

M-O suggested that government campaigns might have been more successful:

a) if there weren’t so many of them – if you could tell the wood from the trees, the should from the must;
b) if similar kinds were clearly and intelligently related to the whole plan;
c) if there was less pleading, more leading;
d) If the background to needs and resistances were pre-studied and post-checked more factually and dealt with on a sounder psychology. [Footnote 6]

The war had prompted a “thorough examination among the nations elites of what constituted British national identity” [Footnote 7]. It was recognised that new techniques needed to be adopted to increase the effectiveness of propaganda, and the government went to considerable expense to set up, and maintain, the Home Intelligence Division, to discover whether posters would be effective, and if so, how to target them better. The government appeared to recognise, if rather belatedly, the importance of providing accurate information to the people, realising that if people understood the reasons for restrictions, they were far more likely to accept them.

Although we have gained an impression of a government that was out of touch with its people, we have to bear in mind that the large majority of sources available about reactions to posters were designed to provide constructive criticism, and were not really concerned with praising any posters. As such, we cannot really gain a balanced view on the success of government posters.

The very fact that so many posters were needed, aside from the other means by which campaigns were disseminated, begging people to do various activities, is indicative of a lack of ‘pulling together’. However, we need to note that the Government did not appear to feel the need to legislate; persuasion was perceived to be enough. The Emergency Powers Act of 22 May 1944 allowed the government unlimited power over its citizens, but it appears that they chose not to use such power [Footnote 8]. Although the State had more involvement with the people than ever before, there was felt a need to be careful as it was claiming to fight a war on behalf of democracy, against totalitarianism, and could not appear to be totalitarian.

When planning a post-war campaign, criticisms were made about the use the government had made of propaganda in the war:

propaganda can operate efficiently only as part of a balanced plan … its real function lies in speeding up and supporting organised effort, focusing on a particular target … It performs the ‘softening up’ process without which other action would be less effective [Footnote 9].

It appeared that the government expected far more from propaganda than propaganda was able to deliver, and that:

the attempt to use propaganda as an easy way of avoiding legislation is a waste of energy, time and money: the role of propaganda more properly being that of explaining to the public the reason for legislation and their part in the altered situation [Footnote 10].

Whilst art historians look for the aesthetic merits in art, the historian looks upon it’s historical merits [Footnote 11] . Posters are culturally relative, they give us an idea of the problems that the government faced in World War Two, and how it dealt with them. Posters could be considered to have exaggerated importance as copies are so easily obtainable, unlike radio broadcasts, where the general public would have to go to great lengths to hear one. Posters are regarded as accessible art by many, but are seen, in art history terms, as poor quality and therefore undeserved of study. However, poster images can be seen as a reflection of the government’s hopes and fears about the wartime population, and in this study we have looked behind the images at these worries. If an image recurred over time, we could assume that such an image appeared to produced the required action.

There is much more that could be done with this subject, including further case studies into areas such as the use of humour, which has been touched upon, or the characterisation of inanimate objects such as potatoes and bombs. It is also conceivable that, through a study of the surrounding legislation, it would be possible to date further posters, and to understand to what extent the government relied solely upon encouragement, or used posters to back up legislation. Further study into the extent to which posters were used nationally or locally would also help us to understand whether the government was in touch with its people. However, within these limitations, this study has uncovered and analysed a number of key features of World War II propaganda.

Footnotes:

  1. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, p17
  2. Report of Planning Committee on a Home Morale Campaign, undated, PRO, INF 1/533
  3. Hunt, J. and Watson, S. Britain and the Two World Wars, 1990, p122
  4. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p54
  5. Unidentified, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
  6. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p16
  7. Weight, R. ‘State, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45’, Historical Research Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, p83
  8. Pearce, M. and Stewart, G. British Political History 1867-1990, 1992, p427
  9. Road Safety Committee: Notes on Propaganda (RSC (44) 58) for Propaganda Sub Committee, [February 1944], PRO, INF 1/687, p1
  10. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p253
  11. Gaskell, I. ‘History of Images’ in Burke, P. (ed) New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 1991, p188

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

    Lewis, R.M., ‘Chapter 8, Conclusion, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL >, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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Case Study: Gendered Images

In a post-feminist age, one could argue that there should also be a chapter devoted to the way that men were depicted and appealed to in posters, but these are generally not relevant to the Home Front, with most posters aimed at men designed to get them to enlist in the services. With the war no longer fought in faraway territories, women were involved firsthand in warfare for the first time. The Government tried to appeal to women in many different ways in their posters.

During the war women encountered impossibly incompatible representations of themselves: from being inessential to national identity, to being central to it, to threatening to it; from being patient wives to mobile women; from being painted ladies to military beauties [Footnote 1].

The ideas of the First World War still held sway in some ways, as through the 1920s and 1930s the woman’s expected place was still the home, although there had been growing acceptance that there were roles for women in the workplace. It was not until there was a need for employed men in the armed forces that women were actually appealed to in the armed support services, or in the factories. The majority of posters still relied upon images of women that emphasised their domestic, passive, maternal, and supportive roles, images that relied upon – and were rooted in – the orthodoxies of contemporary gender relations. We see the growing use of such phrases as ‘The Kitchen Front’, designed to make the woman feel that she was ‘doing her bit’ in the home.

In America, women were encouraged to join the services by a campaign on the theme ‘Release a Man for Combat’, which backfired as it “drew attention to the fact that if wives and girlfriends enlisted they might be sending their own or someone else’s loved one to risk death at the battlefront” [Footnote 2]. M-O claimed that in Britain, the effect was the opposite, as a poster with an illustration of a soldier, captioned ‘IF ONLY MORE WOMEN WOULD HELP’, was successful in increasing the pressure upon women to do war work, although it was only successful because it was well timed, unlike “Many government campaigns [which] attempted to operate in a pressure-less vacuum.” [Footnote 3] After 2 December, 1941, when conscription for women was introduced, posters were more concerned with the choice between occupations for women, rather than trying to persuade them to work at all.

The government faced a dilemma after the mobilisation of women as it was necessary to represent women as patriotic, both in the home, and in the workplace. Although a lack of workers meant that women were necessary in the factories, it was also wished that the war would not interfere with normal domestic arrangements, but “producers of official propaganda dodged this dilemma by separating the woman worker and the housewife” [Footnote 4]. The young, single woman was concentrated upon as the ideal recruit for work, pictured in model patriotic roles (Figure 42), whilst mothers and housewives were shown in domestic settings, wearing frilly pinafores (Figure 43), urged to ‘Make-do- and-Mend’ as their patriotic duty [Footnote 5]. Posters tended to ignore the fact that many women fitted into both spheres.

Posters needed not only to make jobs appear attractive to women, but enable them to identify with the images contained in the posters. Existing members of the ATS and Thelma Cazalet criticised Abram Game’s ‘ATS’ poster (Figure 44) for over-emphasising the glamour of service life, and it was a consequently withdrawn for being ‘too glamorous’, replaced with a photo of a serving ATS member (Figure 45), which was believed to lend an air of authenticity to the poster. The withdrawal of the poster suggests that the government felt that the glamorised images would not attract real women, although an MoI official claimed that the poster was not aimed at attracting glamorous girls, and couldn’t understand the objection to an A.T.S. girl being shown as smart and attractive. “One would think from this type of criticism that every effort should be made to show that the service was for the most unattractive and un-enterprising women!” [Footnote 6]

The practice of using idealistic images obviously presented problems for some, such as the farmers who had workers turn up to ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ (Figure 46) in their summer holidays: “Girls turned up dressed as for a picnic and were incapacitated in a matter of hours.” [Footnote 7] Idyllic images of the countryside translated into smelly and hard work. The Woman’s Land Army were similarly idealistic (Figure 47), presenting a far more glamorous and clean picture than the reality. It was not only in the countryside that the realities were mis-represented. Factory workers were liable to find their machines taken over for the morning by a troop of glamorous women in ministry-approved war worker outfits, who performed for the benefit of the cameras and were subsequently used to illustrate the mobilisation of women. [Footnote 8]

Allied propaganda spoke directly about and to the servicemen’s fear of betrayal. Posters enjoining silence as a protection against spies implied that women’s talk would kill fighting men. Women are pictured as “irresponsible in their garrulity” (Figure 24), and as “sinister in their silence” (Figure 48) [Footnote 9]. It was felt to be very important to make people realise their responsibility as

the anti-gossip campaign will never be as effective as it should be unless everyone in the country realises that it is not necessary to be an out-and-out ‘long-tongued babbling gossip’ to be, potentially, one of the silly asses in the cartoons, jabbering away in public places. [Footnote 10]

Fougasse was felt to be very effective as “his victims laugh even while they see themselves as Fougasse sees them” [Footnote 11]. (Figures 18 and 24)

The most famous poster of the ‘Keep mum, she’s not so dumb!’ series, designed for the officers’ messes, contained a beautiful woman known as ‘Olga’ (Figure 48), although there were others produced aimed at lower ranks ( Figures 49 , 50 & 51 ), with the slogan used in other national campaigns. ‘Olga’ is presented as a ‘femme fatale’, a glamorous vamp, a spy whose charms will endanger national security. It is an idea that is repeated in ‘Don’t tell Aunty and Uncle’ ( Figure 52 ), with a young, apparently naked woman, evidently intent on gaining information, and again in A maiden loved; an idle word; a comrade lost; and Adolf served ( Figure 53 ) praised as presenting a “complete story in twelve words, full of pep and punch and straight to the point” [Footnote 12]. Such an image popular in many countries, although Lant claims that such images were really only used in Britain before it was realised what a shortage of “manpower” there was going to be [Footnote 13].

Dr Edith Summerskill complained that the ‘Keep Mum, She’s not so dumb’ series was degrading to women as housework should be deemed to be an economic contribution to family life [Footnote 14]. Indeed, M-O found that the posters did not really appeal to women, as most did not feel (consciously) that they were being kept, and were “unable to think of themselves in a situation where they would ‘BE LIKE DAD'”, although women were more commonly felt to be stimulated by joke appeals [Footnote 15]. M-O found that the pun in the slogan was lost upon many in the working class, whilst those in the middle classes felt that the slogan was undignified, and most did not call their parents ‘Dad’ and ‘Mum’ anyway [Footnote 16]. M-O felt that the dis-illusionment with government campaigns and slogans in general which followed the failed ‘Silent Column’ ( Figure 54 ) had also lent an antagonistic effect to any new campaign dealing with the issue of careless talk [Footnote 17].

Women were seen as danger as they could infect fighting men with venereal disease (VD). Reginald Mount’s “Hello boy friend, coming my way” ( Figure 55 ) shows the feminine allure of the veiled hat and the ‘vaginal flower’ which would “lure soldiers to dissolution and death”, signified by the skull of the woman [Footnote 18]. Note that virginal fictional heroines also wore such hats, and that it was the text ‘the easy girl-friend’ that lent the ‘sensual connotations’ [Footnote 19]. Its effect upon the innocent bride ( Figure 56 ) was designed to make men feel guilty about their free and easy ways, whilst women were made to feel guilty about the effect that VD could have upon their children ( Figure 57 ).

The very fact that posters about VD could be put up is significant as although it was recognised that war led to an increase in VD, the British government generally tried to avoid the issue, with the 1916 Venereal Diseases Act, which made it slander to imply that anyone was infected with VD, still in force [Footnote 20]. However the VD rates hit such epidemic proportions that in October 1942 a campaign was finally begun [Footnote 21]; its purpose to make the public aware of the symptoms of the disease, and the treatment available. It had been feared that the public would be squeamish about such issues, but a survey revealed that ninety per-cent of the public approved of the posters that were designed to shock [Footnote 22], and we have to take into account the fact that between the wars, advertising about bodily functions had become a normal occurrence.

Kirkham argued that there “was no ‘masculinisation’ of women’s body shape” [Footnote 23] during the war, and that the ‘New Look’, with the small waist, and an emphasis upon the bust, associated with post-war fashion, was also fashionable in war-time, when it was seen as part of the female duty to remain feminine: “beauty as duty … conveyed something of the stiff upper lip associated with the British upper classes” [Footnote 24]. Consider the difference between Figure 58 and 59 , where the first picture appears to have been rejected due to the masculine appearance of the woman. With the government attempting to persuade women to wear their hair in certain ways, in posters, hair styles are presented only as those which were the most sensible ( Figure 60 ). Generally only those in a fully domestic situation, or one of the glamorous spies mentioned, would be shown with long hair [Footnote 25].

Figure 61 was rejected, and it was suggested that this poster would have deterred mothers from handing their children over [Footnote 26], although IWM PST 0137, containing a very similar picture was accepted for publication. Both posters were entitled ‘Caring for evacuees is a national service’ and although there was legislation in place to make people become hosts to evacuees, this was generally regarded as unsatisfactory, and so it was left to volunteers, and to the discretion of billeting officers [Footnote 27]. In Figure 62 we get an impression of evacuation as a happy, healthy experience, in the joyous countryside with happy, willing hosts.

Having looked at all three case studies, we can see whether the government really did consider, and use, propaganda, specifically posters, as the fourth armament.

Footnotes:

  1. Lant, A. ‘Prologue: Mobile Femininity’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War, 1996, p19
  2. Costello, J. Love, Sex and War 1939-1945, 1985, p70
  3. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p13
  4. Summerfield, P. ”The girl that makes the thing that drills the hole that holds the spring… ‘: discourses of women and work in the Second World War’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Op. Cit., p40
  5. Ibid.
  6. Quoted in World’s Press News, 30/10/41, from a collection of newspaper cuttings entitled ‘ATS Glamour Girl, History 1939-85’ by Abram Games OBE, RDI, held at the IWM
  7. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p129
  8. Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969, p501
  9. Gubar, S. ‘”This Is My Rifle, This Is My Gun”: World War Two and the Blitz on Women’ in Higonnet, M.R., Jenson, J., Michel, S. and Weitz, M.C. (eds) Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, 1987, p240
  10. M-O A : TC Posters, 3/C, Times, 7/2/40, p9
  11. Ibid.
  12. Daily Mail, 7/2/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
  13. Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema, 1991, p76 (emphasis in original)
  14. Unidentified, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum
  15. M-O A: FR 442 ‘Slogan: ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ – Pilot survey’, October 1940, p6
  16. Ibid., p5
  17. Ibid., p4
  18. Gubar, S. Op. Cit., p240
  19. Kirkham, P. ‘Fashioning the feminine: dress, appearance and femininity in wartime’ in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Op. Cit., p170
  20. Costello, J. Op. Cit., p328
  21. Ibid., p127
  22. Ibid., p130
  23. Kirkham, P. Op. Cit., p155
  24. Ibid.
  25. Ibid., p164
  26. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, facing p76
  27. Chamberlin, E.R. Op. Cit., p149
  28. H.M.S.O. Persuading the People, 1995, p17

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

    Lewis, R.M., ‘Chapter 7: Images for, and of, Women in Posters, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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Case Study: The Direct Appeal

M-O claimed that we can divide official propaganda into two main types, the first of which involved appeals for direct action, dealing with practicalities, which would have an immediate effect, such as giving up a saucepan for salvage. The second type was more hypothetical, such as gas mask campaigns, where it would not make any immediate difference to the citizen whether he/she carried his/her gas mask, but would simply be preparing him/her for the coming crises. [Footnote 1]

Unlike in the First World War, when the government had felt that those at home should not ask questions, as they had not truly been involved, in the Second World War, with ‘total war’, the entire population was fully involved. The population needed to be made aware that their actions had direct consequences upon the war effort, and consequently needed far more understanding of government policies; as warfare became more technologically advanced, the armed forces depended proportionately upon the organisational and industrial efforts of those at home. The role of the civilian was crucial in such a conflict, and they were “exhorted to think of themselves as front-line troops” [Footnote 2]. There was

a vivid awareness that the serviceman was a citizen in uniform and the civilian … was perforce another kind of fighter. The list of reserved occupations made explicit what was implicit: in cold military terms the man who made the gun was as vital as the man who fired it [Footnote 3]. ( Figure 31 )

We saw some examples in the last chapter of the relationship between the soldier and the worker, and we can also see in the ‘Dig on for Victory’ poster ( Figure 32 ) the cheerful English worker represented in a soldierly stance, with a pitchfork held in the style of a rifle.

In 1914, the best known British poster of the First World War, Lord Kitchener declaring that ‘Your Country Needs You’, ( Figure 1 ) was produced; “From ten thousand hoardings the compelling finger of Kitchener pointed straight to the passer-by. There was no escaping it.” [Footnote 4] It was much imitated, and later “the public figure directly addressing the viewer became a significant device” [Footnote 5]. The development of this direct appeal was important. It meant that the passer-by would feel that he/she was personally involved in any appeal as the poster would engage directly with his/her eyes [Footnote 6].

One of the most obvious copies of the Kitchener style is Bert Thomas’ ‘Is Your Journey Really Necessary?’, ( Figure 33 ) produced by the Railway Executive Committee, making use of an ordinary soldier, who could be anyone’s brother or friend, rather than an illustration of someone in authority. This appears to have become a characteristic of Second World War posters, with the people asking each other to help out, rather than those in charge asking, or producing guilt feelings, although Churchill adopted the Kitchener stance in Figure 34 which challenged people to ‘Deserve Victory’.

An M-O report claimed there was a difference between ‘You’ and ‘Your’; ‘You’ was directed at the viewer and required action, whilst ‘Your’ did not provide any stimulation to improve [Footnote 7]. For instance, a campaign with the slogan ‘COUGHS AND SNEEZES SPREAD DISEASES. TRAP THE GERMS BY USING YOUR HANDKERCHIEF’ ( Figure 35 ), which although raising awareness of colds and ‘flu, did not “produce appreciable action” as people looked to the posters as ways of avoiding colds themselves, rather than the need to avoid giving colds to other people [Footnote 8].

Another instance when people felt that the message did not apply to themselves was on the August Bank Holiday, 1941. The government had asked people to stay put, and whilst most people felt that it was reasonable for the government to do so, they did not feel that the request imposed any duty upon themselves to do anything about it, consequently record numbers of people took the trains away that day, claiming that if it was essential that they stayed at home, the government would have done more than request [Footnote 9], as there is “no need to plead when you can convince” [Footnote 10]. The campaign was felt to be a waste as the government worked against its own publicity by laying on extra trains [Footnote 11]. M-O summed up a proper propaganda technique as: “The need, plus the need understood, plus instruction, simply stated, equals results.” [Footnote 12]

In many salvage posters we can see the direct effect of contributing salvage, although Figure 36 , along with many other such posters, appears to over-do what could be done with people’s salvage, as three small piles of salvage become shining piles of armoury, when much of the salvage that was collected was not really economical. A particularly first-class example which demonstrated how ordinary objects could contribute to the war effort is a poster by Fougasse ( Figure 37 ), which show various objects of rubbish turning into useful military objects.

Fougasse believed that posters should not be too direct, that they should leave something to the viewer to decide, and so flatter their imagination; he believed that they would remember the message better as they had taken part in decoding the message [Footnote 13]. He used ‘formula figures’ as he felt that photos depicted only one person, whilst he believed that everyone could see themselves in his illustrations [Footnote 14]. Fougasse believed that the use of humour was important as realism states a fact “if you do this it leads to that”, whereas humour suggested that if you “behave like this…”. He felt that realism often bordered on horror, and did not induce people to look at a poster more than once [Footnote 15]. Compare this with the Norman Wilkinson poster ‘A FEW CARELESS WORDS MAY END IN THIS’, ( Figure 38 ) where a graphic realistic picture showed the direct consequence of discussing troop movements.

Another dramatic depiction of the direct effect is ‘They Talked… this happened’ series ( Figures 39 , 40 & 41 ) where one can see the result of a few thoughtless words in the bottom half of each poster, where, in a misty atmosphere, a sombre image of wrecked military equipment is presented.

Having looked at several of the ways in which the government stressed the peoples’ role generally, we will now look specifically at some of the ways in which they used images of, and appealed to, women.

Footnotes:

  1. M-O A: Change No. 2, Home Propaganda for The Advertising Services Guild, [1942], p6
  2. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p2
  3. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p120
  4. Daily Mail, 7/2/40, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the IWM
  5. Hollis, R. Graphic Design: A Concise History, 1994, p34
  6. See Kress, G. and Van Leeuwen, T. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design, 1996, pp122-3 for more details on the mechanics involved in this strategy.
  7. M-O A: TC Posters 1/A, T.H. and G.B. ‘War Posters: Difference between You and Your’, 6/10/39
  8. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p14
  9. Ibid., p61
  10. Ibid., p66
  11. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p254
  12. M-O A: Change No. 2, Op. Cit., p66
  13. Fougasse A School of Purposes: Fougasse Posters, 1939-45, 1946, p30
  14. Ibid., 1946, p35
  15. Ibid., p38

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

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Case Study: International Relations

A major difference between posters of the World Wars is that unlike in the First World War, in the Second World War it “was no longer possible to stir patriotic blood by large references to King and Country”, [Footnote 1] neither was xenophobia rampant. The Germans were no longer depicted as the evil Hun as improved travel and communications meant that many realised that Germans were normal human beings. When war broke out, it was less than twenty years after the previous conflict, and many had believed that all nations involved in it would wish to avoid such a disastrous war again, believing that even the Germans would not wish to get involved again, although they had been visibly re-arming.

The government made attempts to distinguish between Nazis and Germans; people were told that it was a war of ideas, that the “enemy’s recourse to war does not represent the will of the people, but rather reflects the obsessions of misguided leaders”[Footnote 2]. Hitler, consequently, appears to have become the symbol for Germany: he was easy to depict, recognisable simply by a flopped fringe and a black moustache (Figure 17). Fougasse’s cartoon pictures of Hitler and Goering in all places “perhaps tended to convey the impression that the Germans were omniscient, ubiquitous and so omnipotent”[Footnote 3], but they became so well known, that in one poster they are recognisable simply by their uniformed legs (Figure 18).

It was felt that propaganda “should emphasise that our ideals are superior to Nazis’ aims … To harp on villainy only, misses the point and makes for complacency.” [Footnote 4] The use “of atrocity stories … only make the nervous more nervous … [and] we all suspect that the Germans can and are producing similar stories for their own people”[Footnote 5]. It was believed that there was a need to

continually remind people that Hitler’s method is to lull them with promises of relative security and then to destroy them when weakened … this negative horror at the idea of German rule must be supplemented by pride in our own country. [Footnote 6]

as feelings had been aired that people would be better off under the Germans, and that a truce would save much loss of life. This doubtless was what led to the production of the ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster ( Figure 19 ) which was to “convince people of Germany’s aggressive attentions, and to arouse the determination to resist” [Footnote 7]. M-O felt that this poster was a failure as people did not need any further proof of Hitler’s aggressive intentions, and indeed raised a “reluctant admiration for Hitler’s capabilities and concrete achievements” [Footnote 8].

‘Two Cheers for Socialism 1940-1942’, a chapter in Addison’s The Road to 1945 [Footnote 9], describes the struggle that the government had, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, in trying to combine support for the USSR as a war-partner, whilst avoiding the popularisation of Communism. [Footnote 10] Churchill, in particular, was totally anti-Communist and banned the ‘Internationale’ until it was realised that the Soviets were playing ‘God Save the King’ at every conceivable opportunity. [Footnote 11] A M-O survey into a Communist poster ( Figure 20 ), produced soon after the USSR entered the war, encountered differing reactions, with many enthusiastic about their new ally. Yet, many others had reservations about the past behaviour of both the USSR, with its previous alliance with Germany, and the British Communist Party, which had previously been completely against the war, and were concerned that the USSR planned to take over Britain at the end of the war. [Footnote 12] Pro-Russian feeling was generally recognised as high in the country, and Anglo-Soviet publicity was consequently produced, but only in order to steal the thunder of the left [Footnote 13], with relations built up between the Soviet Embassy and the MoI in order to prevent a flow of information to British Communists. [Footnote 14]

It was emphasised that Russians were fighting for their homeland, not for Communism as

Inasmuch as he is for the creation of certain attitudes, the propagandist is necessarily against others; and the extirpation of what he regards as false beliefs and doctrines is as much his concern as the propagation of the ‘right’ ones. [Footnote 15]

Points of common interest were to be referred to, not differences. [Footnote 16] Russians were no more to be referred to as Communists than Britons were to be referred to as Capitalists. Bolshevism was accepted only as superior to Nazism, and it was stressed that “We need not tell the public again that as Hitler had his Gestapo so Stalin has his Ogpu. But we need never let him forget it” [Footnote 17]. Propaganda aimed at the working class was to dwell on the sacrifice of the Russian workers, such as the newspaper advertisement in Figure 21 , and the efficiency of the Russian war machine, whilst propaganda for the middle classes was to stress Russian culture. [Footnote 18]

Some Soviet posters were directly re-printed with captions in English, such as those seen in Figure 22 . The Soviet’s generally depicted Hitler as fairly evil (Figure 23), and one could compare this with British representations of Hitler as a silly, and relatively harmless, little figure, (Figure 24) although this has to be set within the general historical context of a far longer history of German-Russian enmity than of Anglo-German enmity, with the Russians suffering far more at the hands of the Germans.

Other campaigns exhibit a more subtle Soviet influence. The emphasis upon the rule of the proletariat in Communist society led to a glorification of industry in Soviet posters, and, as the government owned the economy, the Soviets were able to concentrate upon campaigns to increase industrial output without worrying about finance. [Footnote 19] The Ministry of Supply produced a poster (Figure 25) showing “a gory Hitler … scurrying away from a concentration of ‘Waltzing Matilda’ tanks with blazing guns” [Footnote 20], with the caption ‘When? it’s up to us’ placing the responsibility for bringing the war to a speedy end squarely with the workers in the factory. With the accent upon the close relation between production and the battle front, the Soviet influence was repeated many times in posters in which the soldier urged the citizen on in his/her duty (Figure 26). [Footnote 21] For the factory workers cartoons superseded ‘superb pictorial reproductions’ as the main propaganda weapons, although action photographs were still to be ‘liberally featured’ [Footnote 22].

In 1941 the Ministry of Labour launched a major campaign, designed to make work in factories look appealing and important, including the poster ‘WOMEN OF BRITAIN, COME INTO THE FACTORIES’ (Figure 27). We can see the influence of Socialist Realism in this poster, in the bright colours which attracted the eye; the statuesque pose of the woman in peasant type clothes, and the slogan, which stressed the heroic nature of factory work; and the background scene a glorification of industry. A more outright pro-Russian appeal was made by a poster which declared ‘COVER YOUR HAIR, YOUR RUSSIAN SISTER DOES’ (Figure 28), which held Soviet women up as “appropriate models for emulation by British women” [Footnote 23].

Allusions to the Japanese largely do not appear to come into Home Front propaganda until the end of the war. The Japanese war was seen as a peripheral activity, something in which the Americans were engaged, rather than the British [Footnote 24]. After VE-Day, on 8 May 1945, the British people had to be reminded that the war would not really be over until the Japanese were defeated (Figure 29).

In relation to its attitude to ethnic minorities within Britain, it could be assumed that Britain was entirely populated by white people, as there do not appear to be any posters which appealed to ethnic communities. Black people had long been held to be at the bottom of the social pile, and to bring them into view as workers alongside white British women “went against the long-held colour bar” [Footnote 25]. Although Hitler was “told off in public for undervaluing black men, the British government was privately doing its best to keep black women out of the forces” [Footnote 26], and the only posters which depicted ethnic minorities are those which appealed to a sense of Empire (Figure 30), and even in this poster there is only two ethnic minorities, and they are relegated to the back rows.

Having seen how the government dealt with the issue of foreign nations, we will look at some of the ways in which it tried to make those at home feel that their contribution to the war was important, knowing that flag-waving would not work any more.

Footnotes:

  1. Chamberlin, E.R. Life in Wartime Britain, 1972, p23
  2. McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p20
  3. Calder, A .The People’s War 1939-1945, 1969, p136
  4. Minute Sheet, 27/5/40, PRO, INF 1/533
  5. Ibid.
  6. Report of Planning Committee on a Home Morale Campaign, undated, Ibid.
  7. M-O A FR 74 ‘Grab, Grab, Grab’ poster, 16/4/40, p1
  8. Ibid. p6
  9. Addison, P. The Road to 1945, 1975, pp127-163
  10. See also Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Politics and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945, 1990 for a more detailed study of the evolution of government policies.
  11. Addison, P. Op. Cit., p134
  12. M-O A: TC Posters, 4/C, ‘Red Army Poster’, 8/8/41
  13. Very Secret: Letter from R.H. Parker, 10/2/42, PRO, INF 1/677
  14. Addison, P. Op. Cit., p135
  15. Brown, J.A.C. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing, 1963, p13 (emphasis in original)
  16. Memorandum on possible points in dealing with Russia, undated [July], PRO, INF 1/913
  17. Policy towards Communism: Note by Director of Home Division – RHP, Secret, 12/8/41, p3, Ibid.
  18. Memorandum on possible points in dealing with Russia, undated [July], Ibid.
  19. Weill, A. The Poster, 1985, p295
  20. Advertiser’s Weekly, 9/10/41, p27, from a selection of newspaper cuttings, collected by E. Embleton 1939-1946, held at the Imperial War Museum. (Hereafter, Embleton Collection, IWM)
  21. Weill, A. Op. Cit., p295
  22. Advertiser’s Weekly, 9/10/41, p27, Embleton Collection, IWM
  23. Lant, A. Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema, 1991, p84
  24. McLaine, I. Op. Cit., p158
  25. Jarrett-Macauley, D. ‘Putting the black women in the frame: Una Marson and the West Indian challenge to British national identity’, in Gledhill, C. and Swanson, G. (eds) Nationalising Femininity: Culture, sexuality and British cinema in the Second World War, 1996, p120
  26. Ibid., p121

If you wish to cite from this page, please use the following citation:

Lewis, R.M., ‘Chapter 5: International Relations in Posters, Undergraduate Thesis: The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, <URL>, written April 1997, accessed Enter Date Here

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