This chapter focuses on the production and distribution of government publicity in the Second World War. The Ministry of Information (MOI) was expected to be the central governmental publicity machine, an institution that sought to regulate its population through discourse. In this chapter we briefly consider its formation and role, including how it drew on previous experience, and gained the power to influence British propaganda, but concentrate more explicitly on the publicity producing divisions. Within this chapter, we reflect upon how the MOI looked to promote self-regulation amongst British subjects, providing them with information, in order to produce what Foucault would term âdocileâ, âusefulâ, âfunctionalâ and âproductiveâ bodies contributing to the British war effort. Having seen how the MOI generally worked, and the place of the poster division within that, we will move on to consider how the division commissioned, produced, distributed and displayed posters throughout the war, focusing particularly on the posters produced in the first few weeks of the war.
Most historians dealing with the subject of the wartime MOI have started from the premise that the MOI was a shambolic and disorganised division, unprepared for the start of war.[1] Like any wartime creation, the MOI underwent many changes, and it is certainly difficult to define the structure of the MOI, even just one portion of it, as it continued to reorganise in the face of press criticism. Early on in the preparation stages the planners recognised that the public needed âa definite conviction that the whole question of Government Informationâ would be âin firm and efficient handsâ. Tying in with the âmagic bulletâ theory outlined on page 54, it was believed that the citizen would need to be âclearly and swiftly told what he is to do, where he is to do it, how he is to do it and what he should not doâ.[2] The Fleet Street Press, however, threatened by the possibility of state regulation and censorship, aggressively targeted the MOI, although news and censorship were no longer functions of the MOI after October 3 1940.[3] Local newspapers looked to the MOI as âhelpersâ rather than âoppressorsâ, and thus the reputation was higher in the provinces.[4] With many âhow-toâ books produced during the inter-war years, suggesting that anyone with a measure of common sense and intelligence could be successful in advertising,[5] the âaverage manâ also believed that, although he could not criticise the service departments, he could criticise the MOI.[6] Historians, including Chapman, are now challenging the idea that the MOI was a dysfunctional failure. Chapman used the Films Divisions of the MOI as a reference point to demonstrate how âa democratic state created a workable and efficient propaganda organisation almost from scratch⦠one which played its full part in achieving eventual victory.â[7] Controversy and failure always create more interest for historians, but more attention should be paid to the achievements that the MOI actually made.[8]
Planning for the establishment of the Ministry of Information in a time of war started on October 14 1935, with the formation of a sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID).[9] The formation of the MOI has been well documented in several texts,[10] but we consider here some issues that are central to this thesis. Several disparate agencies had been involved in propaganda in the First World War, with home propaganda the responsibility of the National War Aims Committee, established to combat âwar wearinessâ.[11] There was no Ministry of Information until 1918, an unpopular organisation with the British governing élite who found its work distasteful and âun-Englishâ.[12] Despite Beaverbrookâs desire for the MOI to have a post-war function, the MOI was disbanded almost immediately the war ended.[13] Interwar developments in physical communication methods and theories of propaganda suggested that for any future large scale war, the efficient conduct of propaganda activities, for which the MOI would be key, âmight prove to be scarcely less important than those of the fighting servicesâ.[14] The new MOI planners wished to profit from their example, but the records were unable to be found, either destroyed or lost in transit during the intervening decades,[15] although some information was collated.[16]
Enthusiastic volunteers planned the MOI alongside full-time work.[17] Sir John Reith proposed that the home front took âclear precedenceâ over foreign fronts,[18] but his suggestions were rejected in favour of a paper by Leeper of the Foreign Office. Leeper stressed a similar set up to governmental publicity prior to 1917. He did not appear to have assimilated the fact that the MOI would be aiming at an entirely different audience to that of the First World War, more directly concerned with the Home Front rather than simply recruitment. As Campbell-Stuart noted when he resigned from the MOI in 1940, âwhat had done very well for the Kaiserâs war would not do for the Führerâsâ.[19] Robertson noted a comprehensive propaganda policy, using the most up to date publicity, would be required immediately on the outbreak of war. The MOI could not take up where it had left off in the last war, as there had been enormous developments, including the advent of broadcasting, a âgreat and enormous channelâ and film had progressed greatly.[20] Leslie, of the Gas, Light and Coke Company, had been involved in the shadow organisation for the MOI. He had got the impression âthat the plans were ambitious⦠in their evident intention to include within the Ministry every possible channel of communication between the Government and the peopleâ.[21]
During the inter-war years, information activities had become an accepted function of government.[22] After the Post Office established a public relations division in 1933,[23] practically all government departments had established a press liaison section.[24] Grant cites the existence of these various agencies as a major problem in the formation of a centralised propaganda department in the Second World War. Each department wanted to conduct propaganda in their own way and objected to centralisation. They felt that those responsible for designing propaganda policy needed to have control over its production as well.[25] From the variety of these agencies arose the idea for national agency, with increased inter-departmental workings forming the basis for the MOI.[26] Tallents and Reith called for a centralised department, particularly with regard to posters and films, which were âof a highly technical characterâ, and required âexpert staffâ.[27] Pre-war, the Ministry of Labour, the Armed Forces and the ARP all ran âoverlapping and wastefulâ campaigns that competed for recruits, with each department explaining the campaign only from angle of their interest.[28] The MOI expected to âbe regarded in principle as the centre for all Government publicity concerning the warâ, undertaking publicity for wartime departments. Peace-time departments with publicity organisations were expected, at least initially, to continue their own work.[29] The publicity work of government departments was considered by the Select Committee, specifically: the Admiralty, the War Office, the Post Office, the Board of Education (which included the National Fitness Council), and the Ministry of Labour. Although often the objective and type of publicity used were the same, the methods used were fundamentally different.[30] Experts in the United Kingdom were also consulted, particularly the Post Office (GPO), and it was even suggested that their poster production machinery would be taken over.[31] Note had also been made of peace time activities of agencies such as the British Council, and a wide range of commercial companies and agencies, including LPTB, Shell-Mex,[32] Imperial Airways, and Kodak.[33]
Much of the Ministryâs planning was done in secret as the government were fearful of public reactions when seen to be using âpropagandaâ, as seen in the previous chapter, a word which had received many negative connotations since the First World War. In January 1938 a progress report established that a lot of work had been done,[34] although when the MOI was mobilised for two days over the Munich crisis in September 1938,[35] it was shown that there was still much to be done. Although a false alarm, this raised the question of whether the MOI could be left unformed until war had already begun, or whether it could form prior to war. There were problems with either decision, the former leading to confusion due to a lack of preparation, the second âessentially meant war, and the Government could not allow the impression to form that it had resigned itself to such a probabilityâ.[36] A plan presented by Sir Stephen Tallents, a senior civil servant with a lot of previous publicity experience, to avoid the unpreparedness of the MOI shown at the Munich crisis, was rejected as it involved some take-over of the work of the peace-time departments.[37] Blamed for the Ministryâs problems, Tallents was dismissed, replaced âby a man with no prior experience of propagandaâ.[38]
It was known that the next war would be fought by the civil population, and it was expected to be a war of nerves, where maintaining public morale was to be of âprimary importanceâ. The government would have âto go far beyond anything that has been done in the pastâ, using âevery existing and conceivable type of advertising publicity and showmanshipâ, which would have to âbe utilised and co-ordinatedâ, producing the argument for a central controlling office for information.[39] Lord Macmillan claimed that not many people felt âthe urgency and importance of this fourth armamentâ or recognised âthe severe and practical preparation which its effective use involve.â[40] Cooper conceived of the MOI as one of the fighting services: Goebbels propaganda machine was successful because he fought with a vast army at his back, unlimited expenditure, and no opponents in the field.[41] The government could not âafford to have the British public less united and less enthusiastic than the German publicâ. The Home Publicity Division (HPD) complained that they had to âcompete with an enemy machine, costing millions a year, which touches and influences every phase of the national life and which has taken years to build upâ.[42]
The MOI was not formed until the outbreak of war, with Lord Macmillan appointed as Minister of Information on September 4 1939,[43] at which point the MOI was composed of an Executive and an Advisory Council. See Appendix 6 for the layout of the Executive Council on September 8 1939, comprised of thirteen Directorates, composed of four major groups.[44] The MOI went through several Ministers in quick succession. Macmillan, with a Tory seat in the House of Lords, was criticised as he was unable to defend the position of the MOI in the House of Commons.[45] On January 5 1940 he was replaced by Reith, previously director-general of the BBC.[46] Reith looked to Chamberlain for support in standing up to the Service departments,[47] and fought to achieve War Cabinet rank for the MOI.[48] He complained that the MOI had no real authority,[49] and could not properly function without access to all the relevant information.[50] On May 12 1940, Churchill replaced Reith with Duff Cooper, providing the place on the War Cabinet that Reith had coveted.[51] Criticised, particularly for the quality and quantity of MOI staff,[52] Cooper noted that there was plenty of advertising talent within the MOI, but that it was an uncontrollable âmonsterâ.[53] He blamed many failures of the MOI on Churchill, who he believed was not interested in the subject.[54] On July 20 1941, Brendan Bracken was appointed Minister of Information. Unlike his predecessors, Bracken, a close associate of Churchillâs throughout the 1930s,[55] could get the press[56] and the Prime Minister to listen to his ideas, was confident in tackling the Ministryâs adversaries, and scorned âthe exhortation of the British publicâ.[57]
As the MOI underwent many changes, there were very few divisions that remained in place from the beginning to the end of the war. It was planned that the MOI would be developed in two stages, with Publicity and Collecting Divisions to be established later, but as soon as possible after war was declared.[58] In 1935, it was expected that the Publicity Division would ensure that the national cause was properly presented to the public both at home and abroad. Government and enemy actions were to be explained, examined, and criticised. Its role would be âto watch for subjects in which publicity is requiredâ; âto prepare materialâ; and âto arrange the distribution of such material through the appropriate channelsâ. It was expected that there would be separate sections dealing with each type of propaganda medium. The head of each section would advise whether the topic was suitable for his medium, and suggest topics for which it was suited. It was anticipated that there would be a general section to determine all policy and allot media in consultation with heads of sections.[59] In November 1937, preparatory work began,[60] and in July 1938 the planning of the HPD was begun in earnest.[61] Geographical departments would plan and guide publicity, whilst the technical departments would execute, in consultation, the plans.[62] Publicity producing and publicity using divisions, although separate, needed to be âthought of as complementary to, rather than independent ofâ each other. Producer divisions, with their expert knowledge, were able to give valuable advice as to the form which the material could best take, and could suggest fruitful lines of policy. They could not, however, turn out material that had not been sanctioned by the publicity division for whose use it was intended, being mainly executive agents of the users.[63] The HPD did all publicity work, including leaflets, exhibitions, press advertising, posters, pictures, photographs and documentary films. It was deemed âvery desirableâ to all the various media under one Controller, to ensure that their use could be balanced within âany particular publicity campaignâ.[64] The HPD was expected to use outside agencies, both at home and overseas, some specialised, and would be âdirectly dependentâ on the âguidance of the Collecting Division, both in deciding its policy and in assessing its resultsâ.[65]
The MOI undertook three main types of campaigns. There were campaigns initiated within, and conducted entirely by, the MOI. There were campaigns undertaken by the Ministry at the request of other Government Departments, including evacuation for the Ministry of Health, salvage for the Ministry of Supply and âDig for Victoryâ for the Ministry of Agriculture. There were also campaigns initiated locally by the Regional Information Officer (RIO) on behalf of the MOI, or at the specific request of the Regional Commissioner for Civil Defence or of Regional officers of other government departments.[66] The MOI queried whether the campaign was essential, and, if so, whether legislative or administrative action was necessary, with publicity providing the explanation. If legislative action was necessary, but refused, propaganda campaigns were rejected as propaganda campaigns were not a suitable substitute. Once a campaign was agreed on, decisions needed to be made as to whether the campaign should consist of explanation or a persuasive emotional appeal. Inadequate explanation was deemed pointless, but emotional appeals were considered to have been overused. Any resistance to government requests needed to be understood, whether material or mental factors.[67]
Before undertaking work originating from other departments, the MOI required an official letter asking them to undertake responsibility, and âexplaining precisely what their policy is and what they want us to doâ.[68] The HPD would then decide, in consultation with the General Production Division (GPD), after submission to the Director-General, whether to accept the campaign. The GPD would consider
the conditions leading up to the request; whether the conditions are such that publicity can be effective; what kind of publicity can be effective; the extent of the publicity necessary; the effect of the proposed campaign on other campaigns.[69]
If accepted, the Directors of HPD and GPD would then consult with representatives of the requesting department to get ideas and greater detail, although the MOI was not committed to using the ideas suggested. The HPD would then meet with the GPD, Editorial, Films and Radio Relations where everyone could pool their ideas and draw up a rough outline of the campaign, allocating responsibilities to each producing division. Each would then work out the detail of their share of the campaign, and reconvene to settle the order, before submitting to the Director-General for approval. The GPD would take responsibility for posters, undertaking technical work that would be displayed on voluntary sites, and instructing advertising agents to do work on a commission basis where necessary. The HPD would direct and co-ordinate the general working out of the campaign and for work (such as a letter from the Queen to evacuees parents) outside of the technical production divisions.[70] Treasury sanction would then be sought. Once agreement had been reached between the MOI and requesting department, the GPD had a responsibility to see that the plan was carried out, consulting an agreed panel of experts if necessary, and keeping the originating department informed.[71]
By 1940 the HPD was part of the General Division,[72] its duties distributed between the three functional divisions, the Regional Administration Division and RIOs.[73] The Home Morale Emergency Committee (HMEC) was formed in May 1940,[74] essentially an ad hoc committee that made detailed recommendations in order to deal with public morale.[75] Deciding that exhortations were pointless, they decided that people wanted direction and concrete orders.[76] By mid-1940, the HPD had broken down, and the HMEC expanded to become the Home Planning Committee (HPC).[77] The HPC felt that their role could only work if they had financial control, and if all important proposals for campaigns were discussed at weekly meetings,[78] achieving their goal on August 26 1940, when no fresh financial commitments could be made without the HPCâs approval.[79] The HPC met daily after the Policy Committee, when it discussed the measures required to carry out policies which had been decided on, referring back to the Policy Committee for further guidance, if necessary.[80]
The Treasury ruling passed in 1940 required that all government advertising, other than that issued by the National Savings Committee, should be issued through the MOI.[81] The MOI never gained actual control over the publicity of the Ministry of Food, or the National Savings movement,[82] whilst other departments appear to have used the MOI only as a formality.[83] There is evidence that, initially at least, the Ministry of Food was prepared to work with the MOI. It understood that the role of the MOI was âthe defence of the home frontâ, in which food was an important âobject of attackâ. To assist the MOI to carry out its publicity functions the Ministry of Food supplied âinformation and notes as the basis of argumentâ. They then worked in close consultation, but it was the âaffairâ of the MOI âto prepare the statement of the case based on our notes and to âput it overâ?â.[84] The division of responsibility was explained in December 1940 as: âmost changes in habits (good or bad) are promoted by other Ministries, e.g. rationing, curfew, ⦠changes in beliefs, e.g. belief in official communiqués, are the direct concern of this Ministryâ.[85] The financial responsibility was unclear as there was no scheme for the partial allocation of expense, such as the production by one Ministry and distribution by another. For example, if there were to be a general campaign against waste, anti-food-wastage posters would be part of the general scheme, and their cost would be borne by the Ministry of Information, or the Stationary Office Vote. On the other hand, should the Ministry of Food decide to persuade the public not to waste certain special food commodities, the publicity would have to be financed by the department.[86] Waterfield regarded financial responsibility as an important issue as it determined whether the MOI was regarded as the âmere servantâ of other departments, or whether it should be regarded as a âresponsible departmentâ.[87] The danger was that if departments had asked for a campaign to be given coverage and the MOI did not oblige, they would ârun campaigns themselvesâ, when the MOI had felt that âthe absorptive capacityâ of the public had been exceeded.[88]
In July 1940, the MOI appeared unsure as to who exercised control over posters, particularly Government and trade posters.[89] The MOI did not have the power to change the wording of anything that passed through the department, and, in June 1941, Cooper was driven to asking that the Ministry of Information be given more power, or that it be disbanded altogether.[90] In 1942, there was still lack of control, as it had been agreed to comply with Churchillâs decision not to promote post-war aims, but the ABCA posters âYour Britain, Fight for It Nowâ (figures 18 to 20) were still produced through the MOI.[91] It is unclear when the Campaigns Division formed, but it was in place by the end of the war. Exercising central control, it ensured that every campaign was given its âproper relative importanceâ amongst all government campaigns, avoiding possible conflicts. Each campaign was planned to make proper use of all suitable media, with associated commercial and government groups protected from uncoordinated demands. Available advertising agencies were used âwith due regard for the proper spread of Government patronageâ.[92] The Campaigns Division, also responsible for press advertising, was âdirectly and technically responsible for the production and distribution of millions of leaflets and postersâ, and spent âover half-a-million pounds per annum on poster site hireâ.[93]
At the outbreak of war, it was expected that £250,000 would be spent in the first two months of war, including £185,000 on propaganda,[94] of which £50,000 was expected to be spent on posters.[95] In the first six months of war, £27,036 was spent on posters, including the costs of design roughs, artistâs fees, site hire, distribution and other costs.[96] In 1942, £4,000,000 was spent on publicity (a 33% increase on the previous year), of which £120,000 was spent on posters, art and exhibitions, with the MOI working as an agency for eighteen government departments.[97] In 1942, probably within the last quarter, £1,009 was spent on art work for posters, £25,306 on site hire, distribution and other costs.[98] In what was probably the first quarter of 1943 £1,724 was spent on art work, and £37,455 on site hire, distribution and other costs.[99] By 1943, 10% of the entire MOI publicity budget was spent on the home front, out of which 4.32% was composed of expenditure on posters.[100]
By May 1939, planning staff had been employed in the GPD, including a General Production Manager to co-ordinate technical planning, an assistant with a specialised knowledge of outdoor publicity, copywriters, research workers and a part-time artist to execute roughs (see Appendix 7).[101] By mid-June the register of artists and collected samples of their work was ready, and the first poster-roughs complete.[102] In normal commercial practice, three months was considered usual from âthe decision to start the production of a poster and its appearance on hoardingsâ. After consultation with HMSO, it was hoped that it could be possible to effect the production of a poster in a fortnight, and once war had started, possibly in one week.[103] In some cases this was achieved, with a campaign on behalf of the Ministry of Home Security printed and distributed within ten days of financial authority.[104] The GPD remained in place throughout the war.[105] With an administrative and technical staff of 30, it was âresponsible for the writing and production of all printed matterâ, including articles, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and posters, âto meet the requirements of the four primary Divisionsâ. The GPD could, and did, call âto its aid professional advertising firms which specialise in the form of publicity which it is decided to employâ.[106] For posters, newspapers and other publicity, the Department acted as âadvertising agent to other Ministriesâ and was âresponsible for the preparation and execution of campaigns of varying character and extentâ to meet requirements. The work undertaken in the Ministry was intended to be in the ânature of review and controlâ, as it was not intended to âundertake production directâ except in the absence of âsuitable external facilitiesâ.[107] In November 1940, discussions were under way as to whether to rename the General Production Department, the Poster and Publicity Division. This would be comprised of five sections: ordering, execution and checking of work; distribution of publicity material; management of campaigns and general administration; publication of periodicals, copy and ideas; design, layout and lettering in the studio.[108] Vaughan complained that this tile was âhardly descriptive of the work we doâ, and suggested that Publicity Division alone was appropriate if renaming was necessary.[109] The DG said that he preferred the old title of GPD and ordered that it continued to be used.[110] The GPD included the understaffed Outdoor Publicity Department where âthe poster requirements of 19 Government Departments are at present being negotiated and handled by only 2 seniors, 3 J.A.S. and 6 juniorsâ. Few campaigns operated âwithout poster publicityâ, but posters were handled by âunderstaffed juniorsâ, and £300,000 worth of paid-for posters sites, and voluntary sites were ready for use, but not being professionally maintained.[111]
Edwin Embleton, Studio Manager for the GPD, was responsible for preparing contracts and ensuring that work was fulfilled by artists and copywriters on time.[112] On occasions it was difficult to recruit[113] and retain workers. Advertising specialists, although they âwished to remain patrioticâ, were earning half of what they could earn commercially, and as a result Embleton was losing skilled men, particularly as civil service rules did not allow for workers to take moonlight work.[114] The GPD was often over-stretched, but Woodburn believed that this called for better quality, rather than quantity, officers, which cost-cutting measures did not allow for.[115] Reginald Mount worked full time for the MOI throughout the war, and Eileen Evans and Austin Cooper joined later.[116] Outside the MOI other freelancers were used, including Tom Eckersley in the Air Force, Pat Keely at the GPO, Abram Games the only âOfficial War Office Poster Artistâ, with Frank Newbould his assistant. The artists all maintained their identity as freelancers in a large design organisation âwhich appears to have positively nurtured creative workâ. Designers recall it as a happy working time, designing for a serious purpose, and working largely without restriction. Freeman comments that âperhaps because the MOI was new and its policies were evolving it was receptive to innovative design ideas.â[117] Outside agencies were employed on creative production by the GPD as much as possible, but practical limits were imposed by the necessity for close co-operation with user divisions, the need for secrecy and confidentiality with certain material, the need for speed and cost.[118] By March 1941, with a larger staff, the studio was able to contract out less work. Straightforward work such as the âfinishing up of letteringâ was still given to outside studios, releasing studio artists to concentrate on fresh creative work,.[119] It is unclear whether artists were commissioned or offered their services in every case, although how poster artists had been selected pre- war by other government departments were considered.[120] The MOI desired to be a
centre with which writers and artists desiring to use their talents in the national cause can be in touch with a view to securing information, advice and such other facilities as it may be possible to give them.[121]
The MOI was expected to get the best value, and to obtain quotations from artists as non-competitive tenders always âattract criticismâ,[122] although later it was said that competitive tendering was expected to increase the cost.[123]
Dame Laura Knight, an established classically trained artist, was asked, in October 1939, whether she was âinterested in the possibility of producing a Pictorial poster to be used in Government publicity?â[124] Later, a âpreliminary sketchâ was requested, common practice in government departments, for which ten guineas would be paid. A further sixty guineas would be paid for the finished design, processed only if the design was passed.[125] Knight complained that she never made preliminary sketches as size âmakes so much difference to compositionâ.[126] After debate it was noted that exceptions for any artist, however distinguished, could not be made as it would be unfair to other artists who had to work under the conditions.[127] Knight was given ten to twelve days to produce a rough picture, allowing 8â? for wording, and signed a formal contract giving up the right to copyright.[128] The wording, in some cases at least, was not considered an integral part of the design, with five guineas paid for the âlettering for a 20 x 15 posterâ.[129] Kenneth Clark was given £100, expected to last six months, to pay artists who produced roughs that were not used as posters, for which payment would not normally exceed five guineas.[130] This was the figure offered to Harold Pym, contacted through the War Artists and Illustrators, for a rough design depicting an âaerial dog fightâ, double crown size, for display in the Middle East, with the MOI âunder no obligationâ to accept the rough.[131] Publicity artists were not in a reserved occupation. In February 1941, the War Office was asked to allow Harold Pym an extra fortnightâs leave to complete poster work he was preparing for the MOI, after he was called into Service at short notice.[132] In July 1941, having already handled poster work for the MOI, the War Artists and Illustrators wanted to present further specimens of their artists work to the MOI.[133] Despite complaints that there was a lack of skilled poster artists, Harrington, who had âconsiderable experience in poster design and advertising layout including letteringâ,[134] was told there were no vacancies in the Studio.[135] He was an artist who had experience of industrial publicity, and had ideas for amplifying the âGo to itâ slogan.[136] McKnight Kauffer offered his services to the MOI, but as an âalienâ he was paid on a fee rather than a salary basis, and found himself doing âhack workâ, and thus left for America in late 1939.[137] He did not feel that the best use was being made of his skills, and had he felt he was indispensable at the MOI he would have stayed on.[138] By June 1942 the seriousness of the situation was recognised and a series of letters was sent out to skilled men in the forces, asking whether they were happy to have their name put forward to be released from the forces to work for the MOI.[139]
Finished poster designs would be forwarded to His Majestyâs Stationary Office (HMSO) âtogether with specifications of quantities for printing and distributionâ.[140] In planning to use HMSO, it was questioned whether it could continue to provide the required service at âa very much accelerated rateâ. The HMSO normally took about three weeks to produce about 30,000 coloured posters,[141] which were also more expensive and time consuming, but more effective.[142] Lord Davidson suggested that speed could be improved by employing printers direct, without going through HMSO. Vaughan, however, noted that HMSO had the best machinery âfor ascertaining at any time the state of availability of the print tradeâ, and urgent work could still be placed with printing firms nationwide who were able to take it when necessary.[143] Posters were to be produced using HMSO stock copy, with a high standard to be maintained as work would be associated with the department. Proofs were provided to printers to check the accuracy of type-setting. Writers were to be prevented from regarding them as an opportunity to alter the original subject matter, which would cost more time and money. Before sending to the printer, all proofs were signed by the author, reader and production assistant.[144]
The control of paper was important, particularly once paper was rationed on February 12 1940,[145] with paper more important to the MOI than any other department.[146] It was not anticipated the printers would have any difficulty finding paper at the start of the war, although paper for colour printing required time to mature, and delays would occur if sufficient stock did not exist.[147] The GPD was responsible for the MOI ration, and corresponded with HMSO, the Paper Control and individual printers.[148] With 26.5 tons of paper used for posters by December 1940, decisions had to be made as to whether the stocks of the MOI or the requesting department were used. It was anticipated that printing stocks would come from the HMSO, or from commercial firms hired at MOI instigation.[149] With shrinking newspapers, more use was being made of posters on commercial sites by late 1941, with an average poster display using seventeen tons for a thirteen week campaign. The MOI had handled eighteen major campaigns in the preceding twelve months, and assuming similar figures in the future, it was expected that 306 tons per annum would be used, possibly with increased demand.[150] A letter to the DDG noted that paper controls should not be allowed to interfere with campaigns. If campaigns had been deemed necessary and Treasury sanction had been given, Royds would need only to ensure that âquantities of printed material involved are absolutely indispensable to the success of the campaignâ, and whether reductions could be made that would not âfatallyâ impair it.[151]
Standard commercial sizes, particularly Demy and Crown were to be used to ensure speed of production, unless circumstances dictated differently.[152] Posters of a hoarding size were to be prepared only for long-term campaigns, with posters of a shop-size to be distributed in anticipation of, for example, food campaigns.[153] The government needed to ensure that it was not seen infringing the law, and the size of posters was limited to a maximum size of four-sheets (60â? x 40â?) under âPaper Order No. 16 of May 25 1940â. In June 1940 there were âhome moraleâ campaigns for which the government wished to publish 16 and 48 sheet posters, which were in excess of the maximum permitted size, so a special licence to print was required. Vaughan suggested that the government should be allowed to do so, in the same way that Military Authorities were allowed to ignore speed limits and use unlimited petrol despite public rationing.[154] Government departments were not bound by the law prohibiting large-scale posters, but bill-posters were âinclined to complain on the score of wasting paperâ, and this was deemed a âvalid interjectionâ.[155] Advertiserâs complained at the size restrictions. They recognised the need to conserve paper, but felt that this could be better achieved by giving rations to companies to use as required, rather than by limiting the size of posters. It was argued that filled hoardings added colour to life and by covering bombed buildings would improve morale. The MOI was felt to be setting a bad example by fly-posting,[156] as the public was cajoled by the press to save paper, but every week there was âsome unnecessary publicationâ by the government.[157] In November 1941, legislation was introduced forbidding the use of similar posters near each other.[158]
The distribution of posters was thus vitally important, as Vaughan noted to Woodburn, when there was a threat to the use of Mr Scarborough, who had worked unpaid for the MOI for the first five weeks of war. Scarborough was âcompletely familiar with the whole detail of the distribution of the Ministryâs postersâ. This included distribution to
factories, mills, banks, chain stores, licensed houses, hotels and restaurants, local authorities, employment exchanges, schools, post offices; and bulk distribution through the regional offices of the National Savings Association, the British Legion and the Boy Scouts Association.
Scarboroughâs work involved the controlled despatch of posters to âensure even coverage of the countryâ; the minimisation of waste through the despatch of âprecise quantities and sizesâ requested by exhibitors of posters; and ensuring that exhibitors were not sent more posters than they could show.[159] Whether this plea was successful is unknown, but by August 1940 the Distribution Section within the GPD was responsible for the âdistribution of all material produced or bought by the Ministryâ,[160] and the distribution of posters was generally centralised at Headquarters. Mailings were made direct from the HMSO to firms or organisations nation-wide who undertook to display posters either on commercial or free sites. Distribution through local committees was deemed practicable only in the following cases: where a poster was only to be displayed in âcertain areasâ or âon a particular type of siteâ, when voluntary bodies were expected to co-operate. In certain emergency cases locally held poster stocks could be distributed,[161] with general stocks of posters with space for over-printing of urgent messages prepared.[162] MOI posters could be obtained by applying to RIOs, and could be displayed at exhibitions, in the course of relevant campaigns, and on freely offered private sites. The MOI was responsible for distributing not only its own posters, but those produced on behalf of other departments.[163] The dangers of a central printing and distribution system were recognised in a war where aerial bombardment was a certainty and Regional and Local Organisations were to be allowed autonomous control if communications were cut with central headquarters.[164] Invitations, signed by the Minister, were potentially to be sent to local Advertising Agents and newspapers âto hold themselves in readiness to produce any material, hand-bills, etc. within a few hours if necessaryâ.[165]
Once year-round campaigns were to be run, it was hoped to employ an Outdoor Publicity Agent, achieving economic benefits and ensuring that poster sites were used continuously.[166] Vaughan described the three leading British Advertising Agencies equipped to handle Outdoor Advertising as S.H. Benson Ltd., Crawfords Ltd., and the London Press Exchange, of which Bensons was considered to offer the most complete service. Other agencies which had âless complete facilities for Outdoor Publicityâ would be used for press advertising.[167] Other âresponsible and efficientâ advertising agencies to âwhom Government business could be entrusted with confidenceâ,[168] not previously mentioned, were listed, although the list was not intended to be exhaustive.[169] It was possible that billposting firms could be hired, including The Borough Billposting Co, Walter Hill Ltd., and Willings Ltd. The need to provide work to smaller agencies was also considered, although they were not as well-equipped for handling large campaigns, particularly at short notice. Provincial agents were considered âdifficult to employâ, but would be used if campaigns were locally limited. With the GPD involved in the selection of agents, campaigns could be worked on by more than one agency, but not more than four.[170]
Bensons had previously done work for the War Office and had been paid 10% of the gross plus a service fee of 5%. This fee covered all the âcosts of packing, despatching and carriage of postersâ. The work involved the selection of suitable sites in agreement with bill-posting contractors, monthly inspections, and recommendations of free sites. The inspections ensured that sites remained clean and in good condition, and the opportunity to improve the site position if other advertisers released a site.[171] Bensons initially did work for the MOI, but were replaced by a cheaper firm of billposting contractors. Vaughan complained that the new contractors âhad no system of inspection of sites and no men to carry out such a systemâ, whilst Bensonâs retained 22 men. Uninspected sites could not be used in an emergency, and GPD felt the MOI was being âpenny wise and pound foolishâ in employing contractors Newton and Walter Hill for a commission of 10% instead of Bensons at 15%. The Committee agreed that an inspection service was vital, and just needed to establish in writing that no one else could give the same service as Bensons before they were made sole agents for the MOI.[172] The Advisory Committee decided that they would not employ billposting firms who were also site owners. Bensons and Outdoor Publicity were to be given responsibility for all government billposting work, but were expected to take in smaller firms to give a fair spread of the work during the war.[173]
By 1942 posters were expected to be displayed âwherever free posting can be obtained and for economy reasons should only be fixed at points where there is a considerable amount of pedestrian traffic or large bodies gathered togetherâ. This would include
railway stations, cinema and theatre entrances, shopping thoroughfares, schools, church notice boards, town halls, womenâs institutes, lecture centres of Civil Defence Units and all places where bodies of people are gathered together for special purposes.[174]
Questionnaire respondents noted that they had seen posters all over railway stations, and many town locations were mentioned. Few mentioned rural locations, with ânone seen in smaller villages that I rememberâ.[175] On some occasions, it appears that the distribution process was not careful enough, as appeals to âsave waterâ were regarded as particularly unnecessary near a Scottish loch with an inexhaustible water supply.[176]
The Planning of the First Posters
The Second World War was often perceived as a classless âPeopleâs Warâ because, regardless of any prevailing inequality and exploitation, âthe nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeshipâ.[177] Propaganda was needed to appeal to the masses, including a reasoned appeal that would âshow the extent to which every man and woman is a participant in the warâ, and the importance of a combined team effort.[178] Although it was âimpossible to foreseeâ what conditions would prevail during the first weeks of war, it was felt necessary to prepare for the worst. The MOI was to assume that the public would be subjected to an appalling series of shocks, resulting in shattered nerves, a lack of confidence in ultimate success, and therefore a lack of will to work for victory.[179] It was expected that there would be âan imperative need for a copious issue of general reassurance materialâ, particularly in the early months of the war, which would be the sole responsibility of the MOI.[180] Disregarding Leeperâs conviction that it was impossible to prepare effective propaganda in advance,[181] the government started planning for the first posters in earnest in early 1939.[182] By mid-June 1939 the first poster-roughs were ready for inspection.[183]
In April 1939, members of the HPC were asked to come up with a selection of slogans and motifs from which to build poster designs. The first posters were to âstand out strikingly from among the numerous posters which would be issued by other Departmentsâ.[184] Posters were to âbear a distinctive uniform deviceâ,[185] making it âdifficult or impossible for the enemy to print reproductionsâ. Pictorial distinction was to be achieved by using leading artists whose work would be associated with the MOI; typographical distinction by the use of a âspecial and handsome typeâ.[186] Initial designs were to include a message âfrom the King to his peopleâ.[187] It was decided that the message should âgo out as far as possible in the form in which the King himself would send itâ, but using fine type rather than imitation typescript. Rather than a photograph, a crown would head the poster. Sir William Codling, suggesting a short, single-sheet message, prepared suggestions in a suitable format.[188] Later in the war, it was recognised that the nation was âconstituted through shared and anonymous suffering and heroismâ, and thus the booklet Front Line, produced by the MOI in 1942 contained only one quote from Churchill, and no pictures of royalty.[189]
The above poster was to be accompanied by a âreassurance posterâ, which would âsteady the people and assure them that all necessary measures to defend Englandâ had been taken.[190] The aims for the first poster were ambitious. It was agreed that the first poster slogan, supported by the pictorial design, should if possible: âattract immediate attention and evoke a spontaneous reactionâ; âexert a steadying influenceâ; âincite to actionâ; âharmonise with general preconceived ideas among the publicâ; âbe shortâ; and âbe universal in appealâ.[191] The initial poster was to stress âan attitude of mindâ, rather than an aim, as it was assumed that the public would appreciate the issues involved at the start of war. Nicolson advocated that the initial âdignified designâ should be supplemented by a poster with a âmore colloquial appealâ, such as one âincorporating a historical progression from the medieval English bowman to the typical modern citizen.â[192] Posters would also include a âstatement of the duty of the individual citizenâ, which would be non-pictorial and in more than one colour, and a poster warning against enemy propaganda.[193]
Although experts were consulted for slogans,[194] the slogan for the first poster was suggested by Waterfield, a career civil servant. Concerned that posters along the lines of âKeep Steadyâ were uninspiring, and implied that the nation was on the defensive, Waterfield called for âa rallying war-cry that will bring out the best in everyone of us and put us in an offensive mood at onceâ. He suggested three ideas: a play on Kitchener (figure 2), with âYour King and Country need you allâ, appealing not just to the men to fight, but to âevery man, woman and childâ. Second, he suggested that it was the will of the nation that would win or lose the war, and suggested âYour Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution will Bring us Victoryâ. Third, he felt there was a need for a reminder that it is the task of the nation to destroy Nazism and everything it stood for. Waterfield did not believe that he had the wording right on any of these, but favoured the last.[195]
As production could take a âconsiderable timeâ, designs were to be printed, and distributed regionally, in advance, âso that, when necessary, the posters could be placarded throughout the country with a minimum of delayâ.[196] The initial posters were expected to be of âan exceptional sizeâ, and to be âdisplayed on more than ordinarily extensive sitesâ, such as the sides of buildings, such as figure 61. It was planned that HMSO would be responsible for the printing of posters, and that an advertising concern would be called on to arrange for the display of posters after they had been printed. Mr Surrey Dane and Mr Huxley were responsible for work on the first posters, and agreed to secure the services of artists capable of doing quick roughs for poster designs.[197] It was agreed that the poster art-work should be of a high standard, at least equal to, or better than, the highest commercial standard, but that it should make an essentially popular appeal.[198]
Posters were expected to be displayed for eight weeks at a time. Original plans were to commission five designs, with expert advisors pressing for immediate printing for all five, a valid âinsurance premium in view of the immensity of the riskâ.[199] The Ministry, concerned that this âmight involve considerable waste in view of possible changes of policyâ,[200] was âcontentâ to ask for authority to print from only one design. The proviso was that another four designs were commissioned immediately, rather than waiting for the start of hostilities, as they were unsure âhow quickly suitable designsâ could be produced under wartime conditions.[201] As was good commercial practice, the first poster was to be in six colours.[202] Anticipated costs for the first poster were £20,600 for printing, packing and storing five million posters, and £225 for the design.[203] Figures were prepared by Surrey Dane of Odhamâs Press, on the Publicity Planning Committee of the Ministry, and were largely accepted by HMSO as reasonable.[204] Fees to artists for design needed to allow for accepted roughs and finished art work, adaptation to different sizes and proportions, including reproportioning of lettering. Commissioned roughs needed to be paid for even if ânot accepted for the finished designâ.[205] A significant number of extra posters were required for ârenewalsâ for outdoor display in order to keep sites in good order.[206]
The Distribution of the First Posters
Surrey Dane worked in consultation with Bensonâs preparing estimates for costs, for the nation-wide campaign, to include Wales and Northern Ireland.[207] It was expected that the MOI should pay in the normal way for sites, but seek preferential rates as was usual for large orders.[208] Estimates were prepared according to traditional commercial costs, although it was anticipated that prices could fall on the outbreak of war. Both voluntary sites and commercial sites were categorised.[209] The posters, once printed, were âparcelled and stored in London ready for immediate dispatch to local distribution centresâ at an appropriate time in the emergency period.[210] Posters were to be distributed in bulk ready for local distribution: commercial sites through Bensons, railway platform sites, old EMB sites, newsagents boards, Office of Works, Ministry of Labour, local authorities, LPTB Underground and buses and trolley buses, from 15â? x 10â? to 48-sheet sizes. Smaller amounts, from 15â? x 10â? to 16-sheet sizes were to be distributed to the GPO, schools, cinemas, works, co-operative societies, hotels, public houses and builders. Posters sized 15â? x 10â? to double crown, were provided to banks, van sides, shop windows and interiors, places of worship, National Savings Committee, hospitals and clinics, and 50,000 of a special design for display in empty and wrecked houses.[211] It was calculated that, once the sites were secured, and the finished posters delivered to Bensonâs, a nation-wide display could be effected by that firm within twenty-four hours. Voluntary, non-commercial sites were considered important, particularly in rural areas, where commercial sites did not cover. These sites included shops and shop-windows; government and municipal buildings; village halls, womenâs institutes and private houses. Posters on these sites would be standardised to crown and double crown sizes. The danger of such sites was the juxtaposition of official publicity posters with other miscellaneous posters, âdetracting from the effect of the formerâ.[212] Although in general the largest site was most effective, small posters outside the newsagentsâ shops below eye level attracted special notice people were used to reading such placards all the time in order to get news.[213]
The poster with a proclamation from the King was to be âplastered everywhere in order to drive the contents into everyoneâs headâ.[214] By August 1939 war was regarded as inevitable, and by 9 August the finished drawings were submitted to Macadam for final approval. Any adaptations to proportions would then be made and the posters printed.[215] By 23 August the proportions to be printed were decided. The percentages were: âFreedom is in Perilâ (for remote areas), 12% (figure 22); âKeep Calm and Carry onâ, 65%; and âYour Courage, etc.â, 23% (figure 1).[216] The Treasury had approved costs for a single poster, three designs were produced, exceeding estimates by under £50. âOur Fighting Men Depend on Youâ? for factories, works, docks and harbours, was also printed, for which no allowance had originally been made.[217] By September, âYour Courageâ and âFreedom is in Perilâ were already being posted throughout the country. âKeep Calm and Carry onâ was printed and held in reserve for when the necessity arose, for example, a severe air-raid, although it was never actually displayed. Soon after war was declared, the small poster âDonât Help the Enemy, Careless Talk may give away vital secretsâ (figure 62) was approved by the War Office and was ready to put into production. 58,000 copies had already been distributed by September 17, and 75,000 copies were to be despatched daily from September 26.[218] By the end of September 1939, roughs for further designs had been prepared and approved, including messages from the King and the Queen, designs specifically for factories and docks, and designs specifically for each branch of the armed services: reassurance, not recruiting, posters.[219]
The Reception of the First Posters
Coverage is extensive in the archives on the first few posters produced by the MOI,[220] and so also receives much subsequent historical comment, much of it negative.[221] Mass-Observation (M-O) had been asked by the MOI, on September 26 1939, to âreport on the red Government Posters and their effects, in general; to report on dissatisfaction with the posters and the reasons for them in particularâ. On October 1 1939 MOI said that it could no longer use outside agencies, but M-O decided to complete the work, following the original terms of reference, believing that the work was essential.[222] Working without financial or official support, M-O observers worked without authority, and âagainst the difficulty of spy-fearâ.[223] The âYour Courageâ poster was remembered by several questionnaire respondents, although no other early posters were mentioned. They were seen in the window of the Butcherâs shop in Eastleigh, âon the way to school or work in Winchesterâ,[224] in the engineering works,[225] and believed to be the result of a political speech.[226] The poster was clearly remembered from Barnstaple in Devon, when, as a schoolboy, his âhome town⦠blossomed with crimson postersâ. He remembered that âthese posters were much malignedâ, although the reason was unclear.[227]
A journalist from the Daily Mail was critical of the âYour Courageâ slogan for being too complex, passing the poster six times every day, he was still unable to precisely remember the slogan.[228] Someone from the Ministry of Health, critical of the HPD as responsible for the âYour Courageâ posters, believed that it was run by people âfull of vague ideasâ, with little âpractical experience in the conduct of publicity campaignsâ.[229] Within the M-O survey, âYour Courageâ was the second most-mentioned remembered slogan, and nearly all comment was disparaging. The message had been impacted by sheer repetition but whether it had been remembered in the right spirit was questionable: it still existed everywhere, and was deemed mostly annoying and inappropriate for the wartime situation.[230] The wording of âYour Courage⦠will bring us victoryâ was criticised. There was some evidence the combination of âyourâ and âusâ âsuggested to many people that they were being encouraged to work for someone elseâ, with the âyourâ referring to the civilian, the âusâ to the Government. It was pointed out that the slogan âYour King and Country needs youâ had avoided such a defect and in future, more care should be taken to avoid slogans that disassociated the civilian from the government. âFreedom is in Perilâ was also deemed ineffective, blamed on âthe abstractness of the words, not one of which had any popular appealâ.[231] Even during the planning stages the criticism had been raised that âFreedomâ was rather an abstract concept and was âlikely to be too academic and too alien to the British habit of thoughtâ.[232]
As usual there was little indication as to what the public felt about such exhortations, and little appreciation found its way into print. The Times had described the posters as âegregious and unnecessary exhortationsâ, âinsipid and patronising invocationsâ, which were unneeded and wasteful of funds, comparing the posters unfavourably to those produced by the French.[233] The Times leader paved the way for questions about the campaign in the House of Commons, regarding the cost of the current campaign, and expected costs of future campaigns. Grigg defended the cost of the campaign, expected to be no more than £23,000 by its termination in October, most for site rental.[234] The Daily Express header the day after Griggâs announcement of cost was âWaste and Pasteâ. The exhortations were described as âfoolishâ as people âare prepared to fightâ, but when they turned up at recruiting offices they were turned away as the government was not ready to accept them.[235] Brigadier V.M.C. Napier, commented, via a letter to The Times:
Is it wise, to say the least, to placard the countryside with posters calling on the courage and resolution of the individual when no appreciable demands have yet been made on these qualities?[236]
The MOI had expected the nation to have to deal with immediate bombardment, but this did not happen. Once the Phoney War was over, Advertiserâs Weekly noted that the nation had finally arrived at the point of âcourage, cheerfulness and resolutionâ. People could finally obey the exhortations of posters that had become all too familiar to âusâ over twelve long months.[237]
Responsibility for the failure of campaigns was placed squarely with the government as it meant that, either the people had not been made to feel the urgency of the message, or that âthe leaders have not spoken in a language which the people can understand and respond toâ.[238] Beable, the President of London Poster Advertising Association, felt the MOI should be given due credit as well as criticism. They had acted quickly with the posters, working within the necessity for wording and design to be simple for prompt reproduction and quick absorption. The colour scheme (pillar box red and white) was clever in contrast, both attractive and effective. He felt that the poster had succeeded in getting the public âwar conscious, war energetic, yet war calmly mindedâ, as it had certainly been noticed by the journalists.[239] Possibly reacting to criticism that they had spent too much money on posters, in October 1939, it was decided to cancel the programme of press advertising and the use of commercial poster sites. Steps were taken to give publicity to the material already prepared, through designs suitable to voluntary poster sites.[240]
Original problems for the MOI can be attributed to the instability in the organisation, primarily the result of press criticism. After the original questioning of its role, it appeared largely unremarkable, at the time, that the MOI should have the power to be the central agency for information. The MOI was thoroughly planned, and built upon extensive government and commercial experience. Clear administrative and production processes were instituted, and the importance of using suitable people, to produce the right message at the appropriate time, in the best location, became clearer as war continued. Initially, the MOI transferred the authority of royalty to the propaganda messages. As the war progressed, discourses of royalty were subsumed into discourses of the peopleâs war, tied in with discourses of citizenship, where âshared responsibility for the continuity of the nation remained the most important of these dutiesâ.[241] Democratic, governmental and citizenship discourses clearly emanated from the MOI, with the audience not forced, but subject to self-regulation, although subject-positions were assumed by the MOI. Discourses of the âpublicâ were important, as public opinion was sought in planning and reaction to campaigns. Within the MOI, economic discourses, including those of rationing, played an important part in dictating what was possible. Patriotic discourses were called upon to get artists to contribute, with democratic discourses allowing artists near-autonomy in design, building upon notions that they were the âexpertsâ. Having looked at the first posters that the government produced, the following section of the thesis contains four case studies: urban and rural representations; industrial propaganda; fighting the âenemy withinâ, and dealing with the âproblemâ of venereal disease.
[1] For instance, see Grant, M., Propaganda and the Role of State in Inter-War Britain, 1994, pp.1-4; McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 1979, p.3; and Taylor, P.M. Munitions of the Mind: War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Nuclear Age, 1990, pp.188-194.
[2] PRO INF 1/713, âPublicity: Home: Sub-Committee Proceedings. September 1938 â June 1939â, undated but pre-war.
[3] See PRO INF 1/261, âMemorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red postersâ, October 1939, p.5: âIf the Ministry could be free from such criticism for a few weeks its posters would undoubtedly have a better effect on civilian morale, since some at least of the critical reactions to the posters have been caused by the attacks on the Ministryâ, with âThe reptile pressâ handwritten in the margin. For more information, see Balfour, M., Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, 1979, p.62, and McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.35-42.
[4] PRO INF 1/849, âSecret Memo drafted by Nicolsonâ, January 16 1941.
[5] Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.33.
[6] Cooper, D., Old Men Forget, 1953, p.286; Macmillan felt this rang true from his own experience in the Second World War. Macmillan, H.P., A Man of Lawâs Tale, 1952, p.166.
[7] Chapman, J., The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda1939-1945, 1998, p.vii.
[8] Ibid., p.40.
[9] PRO CAB 16/127, âMIC 1 Committee of Imperial Defence: Sub-Committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information.â, October 14 1935.
[10] Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, pp.53-56; Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.223-246; McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.12-33; Taylor, P.M, âIf War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935-1939â, Journal of Contemporary, History, Vol. 16, 1981, pp.33-45; Willcox, T., âTowards a Ministry of Informationâ, History, Vol. 69, October 1984, pp.398-414.
[11] Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.29. See also Taylor, P., âIf War Should Comeâ, op.cit., 1981, p.33.
[12] Taylor, P.M., The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 1981, p.13.
[13] Ibid., p.46. Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.54 noted that the Nazis, impressed with the British First World War propaganda effort, based their own model on it
[14] PRO INF 1/1, âProgress Report for Period Ended January 31st, 1938, by Sir Stephen Tallents, K.CM.G., C.B., C.B.E., Director General Designate, Ministry of Informationâ, February 1938.
[15] PRO INF 4/1A, âD.B. Woodburn to G.C. Northâ, April 9 1938; PRO INF 1/709, âLetter from Valuation Branch, Customs and Excise to Tallentsâ, September 3 1938; and PRO INF 1/710, âLetter addressed to Tallentsâ, undated but pre-war.
[16] PRO INF 4/1A, Unspecified file, âAims of Home Publicity During the Great Warâ, undated but 1938. PRO CAB 21/1069, Robertson, C.P., âMemorandum on the Creation of a Ministry of Information in Warâ, 12 September 1935 noted that one official even had to resort to the Encyclopaedia Britannica in order to obtain a definition of âpropagandaâ. Captain Peter Chalmers Mitchell, who had been on the Staff of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and later served with the Department of Enemy Propaganda, wrote the entry in question.
[17] PRO INF 1/1, âLetter from Hildred to Tallentsâ, January 8 1938, complained that planners were risking both their health and their jobs working long hours at the MOI.
[18] Willcox, T., op.cit., 1984, p.412.
[19] Cruickshank, C., The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-45, 1975, p.28. Campbell-Stuart had worked for the MOI in the First World War.
[20] PRO CAB 16/129, âMemo of creation of MOI in event of war prepared by Mr CP Robertson of Press Section of Air Ministryâ, September 12 1935.
[21] PRO MH 78/232, âLetter from [K.B.] Leslie to K. McGregorâ, October 3 1939.
[22] Willcox, T., op.cit., 1984, p.398.
[23] Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.46.
[24] PRO CAB 21/1069, âMemorandum on the Creation of a Ministry of Information in war by C.P. Robertson, Press Section, Air Ministryâ, September 12 1935, p.5.
[25] Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.245.
[26] Willcox, T., op.cit., 1984, p.398.
[27] PRO CAB 16/127, âMinutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-Committeeâ, October 25 1935, p.13.
[28] PRO INF 1/10, âFunctions and Organisation of the Ministry. Memorandum by E.B. Morganâ, early 1939.
[29] PRO CAB 16/127, Colville, J., âMinor Changes in C.I.D. Paper No 12530Bâ, May 4 1938, p.5.
[30] PRO MAF 39/05, âReport from the Select Committee on Estimates: Advertising and Publicity by Government Departmentsâ, [1938], p.2.
[31] PRO CAB 16/127, âMinutes of the First Meeting of the Sub-Committeeâ, October 25 1935, p.14; PRO INF 1/711, âPublicity in the United Kingdomâ, undated but pre-war.
[32] PRO INF 1/709, âPublicity Division: Central Organisation: Preliminary. April-October 1939â, undated but pre-war.
[33] PRO INF 1/712, âPublicity in the United Kingdomâ, undated.
[34] PRO INF 1/1, âProgress Reportâ, op.cit., February 1938.
[35] McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.16.
[36] Taylor, P., âIf War Should Comeâ, op.cit., 1981, pp.38-40.
[37] PRO CAB 16/127, âFifth Meeting of the CID sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a Ministry of Information in a time of warâ, 14 December 1938.
[38] Taylor, P., âIf War Should Comeâ, op.cit., 1981, p.45.
[39] PRO INF 1/10, âFunctions and Organisation of the Ministry. Memorandum by E.B. Morganâ, early 1939.
[40] Quoted in McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.15. Interested parties echoed this sentiment. See anonymous, âGovernment has Realised Advertisingâs Possibilitiesâ, Advertising Review, February 24 1940, p.13, quoting Chapman, G.R., Secretary of the Advertising Association. Chapman described wartime publicity and propaganda as Britainâs âfourth armâ, still relatively unused, unlike in German, where such power had been âused for an evil rather than a good endâ. See also, anonymous, âWartime Advertising, in Battledress, Forms a Second Frontâ, Vol. 118, No. 1,535, October 22 1942, p.71, quoting Sir Harold Mackintosh, President of the Adveritisng Association.
[41] PRO INF 1/78, The Times, February 7 1941 (Cutting).
[42] PRO INF 1/302, âHome Publicity Functionsâ, early-October 1939.
[43] Cantwell, J., The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office, 1993, p.113.
[44] PRO INF 1/23, âOrganisation of the Ministry of Informationâ, September 8 1939.
[45] PRO PREM 1/389, âLetter from Citrine, Gen. Sec of Trades Union Congressâ, October 23 1939, listed a deputation to the âPrime Minister, Lord Macmillan, Mr Waterfield and Mr Rucker, from National Council of Labourâ, October 27 1939. For more on Macmillan, see Macmillan, H.P., op.cit., 1952.
[46] Stuart, C., The Reith Diaries, 1975, p.235.
[47] Ibid., p.236.
[48] Ibid., p.247.
[49] Reith, J., Into the Wind, 1949, p.353.
[50] PRO INF 1/857, âMemorandum from A.P. Ryan to the Minister of Informationâ, June 4 1941.
[51] Cooper, D., op.cit., 1953, p.280. See also Charmley, J., Duff Cooper: The Authorised Biography, 1986, and Hollis, C., âMinister of Information: Alfred Duff Cooperâ, Picture Post, June 1 1940, pp.16-17.
[52] Chapman, J., op.cit., 1998, p.14, and Weight, R., âState, Intelligentsia and the Promotion of National Culture in Britain, 1939-45â, Historical Research, Vol. 69, No. 168, February 1996, p.85.
[53] Cooper, D., op.cit., 1953, p.285.
[54] Ibid., p.288.
[55] Lysaght, C.E., Brendan Bracken: A Biography, 1979, pp.190-191.
[56] HLRO, Hist. Coll. 184, Beaverbrook Papers, C/56, âLetter from Beaverbrook to Brackenâ, July 21 1941, Beaverbrook, a key figure in the press, congratulated Bracken on his new position, and offered support.
[57] McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.7. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 270, Davidson Papers, âHome Morale Emergency Committee: Report to Policy Committeeâ, June 4 1940, makes it clear that Bracken was not the first to recognise that the public wanted instructions rather than exhortations, and command rather than comfort, as Cooper was Minister at this point.
[58] See PRO INF 1/1, âProgress Reportâ, op.cit., February 1938, p.24 for further details.
[59] PRO CAB 16/128, âSub-Committee Appointed by Committee of Imperial Defence on October 14 1935â, undated, p.17.
[60] PRO INF 1/1, âProgress Reportâ, op.cit., February 1938, p.24.
[61] Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.241.
[62] PRO CAB 16/127, âProgress Report for Period ending March 31, 1938, by Standing Sub-Committee on the Scheme for a Ministry of Information in Time of Warâ, October 1938, p.11. The geographical departments were divided into the âthe Home Country, the Empire overseas, allied countries, neutral countries, and enemy countriesâ.
[63] PRO INF 1/77, âMinistry of Information, General Organisationâ, undated.
[64] PRO INF 1/712, âPublicity: Sub-Committee Proceedings, July â September 1938â, undated.
[65] PRO CAB 16/127, âProgress Report for Period ending March 31, 1938, by Standing Sub-Committee on the Scheme for a Ministry of Information in Time of Warâ, October 1938, p.10.
[66] PRO INF 1/306, âPublicity Campaigns: Organisation of Local Information Committeesâ, undated, but between January-April 1941.
[67] PRO INF 1/251, âHome Intelligence, Home Front Propagandaâ, undated.
[68] PRO INF 1/340, âNotes of Discussion between D.G., D.D.G., A.D.G., Mr Hilton and Mr Surrey Dane on the Allocation of Responsibility for Publicity Campaignsâ, undated but probably 1940.
[69] PRO INF 1/86, âMemo from Vaughan to DDG: Normal Procedure in the handling of Advertising Campaigns for MOI for other Government Departmentsâ, August 16 1941.
[70] PRO INF 1/340, âNotes of Discussionâ, op.cit., undated but probably 1940.
[71] PRO INF 1/340, âMemorandum on Allocation of Responsibility Between Home Publicity and General Productionâ, January 23 1940.
[72] PRO INF 1/3, âGeneral Division â Progress Report from January 1 to February 21 1940â, February 1940.
[73] PRO INF 1/77, âMinistry of Information: Organisation of the Ministryâ, February 5 1940.
[74] PRO INF 1/250, âSecret: First Interim Reportâ, May 22 1940.
[75] PRO INF 1/250, âReport to Policy Committeeâ, June 4 1940.
[76] PRO INF 1/250, â24th Meeting of the Policy Committeeâ, undated, and PRO INF 1/251, âNotes for the Long-term policy of the Ministryâ, August 24 1940.
[77] PRO INF 1/71, âExtract: Planning Committee: Wednesday, August 21 1940: Composition and Functionsâ, August 1940. Frank Pick was the head of the HPC.
[78] PRO INF 1/249, âFunctions of the Planning Committee, note to Walter Monckton from M. Balfourâ, December 1940.
[79] PRO INF 1/253, âMemo from Sir Kenneth Clark to DDG: Home Planning Committeeâ, undated but probably August 1940.
[80] PRO INF 1/252, âCopies to P.S. and Lord Davidson from Sir Kenneth Clarkâ, April 10 1941.
[81] PRO INF 1/3, âGeneral Division â Progress Report from January 1 to February 21 1940â, February 1940.
[82] Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.61.
[83] PRO INF 1/3, âGeneral Divisionâ, op.cit., February 1940, p.67.
[84] PRO INF 1/343, âLetter from the Ministry of Food to Sir Findlater Stewart at the MOIâ, October 31 1939.
[85] PRO INF 1/251, âMinistry of Information, Plan for Home Publicityâ, [December 1940], (emphasis in original).
[86] PRO INF 1/343, âMemo from CCA [unreadable] to Mr R.W. Harrisâ, November 9 1939.
[87] PRO INF 1/341, âLetter to Hale, Treasury from Waterfield, MOIâ, December 5 1939, pp.1-2.
[88] PRO INF 1/238, âMemo from DDG to Mr EHT Wiltshireâ, April 20 1942.
[89] PRO INF 1/63, Mr Bamford, âSelect Committee on National Expenditure: Sub Committee on Home Defence Services Meeting on July 17 1940â, July 1940.
[90] Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.64.
[91] McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.183.
[92] PRO INF 1/942, âCampaigns Division: Post-War Positionâ, July 20 1945.
[93] PRO INF 1/954, âMemo to DDG from Mr Buxtonâ, undated but 1945.
[94] PRO INF 1/54, âLetter from D.B. Woodburn to ECW, Secretary of the Treasuryâ, September 2 1939.
[95] PRO INF 1/54, âLetter to Mr Waterfield: Financeâ, September 7 1939.
[96] PRO INF 1/60, âPayments made September 3 1939 to March 31 1940â, April 8 1940.
[97] PRO INF 1/75, âParliamentary Debates on MOIâ, 1943. The MOI did work for: Admiralty; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries/Department of Agriculture for Scotland; Air Ministry; Board of Education; Ministry of Food (Poster Campaigns); Ministry of Fuel & Power; General Post Office; Ministry of Health; Home Office and Ministry of Home Security; Board of Inland Revenue; Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Pensions; Ministry of Production; Ministry of Supply; Board of Trade; Ministry of War Transport; Ministry of Works & Planning; and the War Office.
[98] Ibid., âStatement of Ministry of Information Expenditure and Estimate of Commitmentsâ, January 22 1943.
[99] Ibid., âStatement of Ministry of Information Expenditure and Estimate of Commitmentsâ, April 23 1943.
[100] Ibid., âEstimate of the Vote for the Salaries and Expenses of the Ministry of Information for the year ending March 31 1944â, April 1943.
[101] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, May 18 1939.
[102] Ibid., June 8 1939.
[103] Ibid., undated, but June-August 1939. In 1931, a âBuy Britishâ campaign had been achieved in six weeks, but this was only under extreme pressure and in peacetime. In rare cases posters had been got out ten days after the design had been agreed on. HLRO, Hist. Coll. 270, Davidson Papers, âPolicy Committeeâ, June 7 1940, discussed the speed at which the Prime Ministerâs speech could appear as a poster. It was agreed that within a long-term campaign it would take two-three weeks, but if speed, rather than quality, was of the essence, then one-two days was possible.
[104] PRO INF 1/4, âGeneral Division, Progress Report for Aprilâ, May 1940.
[105] PRO INF 1/942, âGeneral Production Divisionâ, December 31 1944.
[106] PRO CAB 21/1069, âHome Divisionâ, undated but pre-war, p.8.
[107] PRO INF 1/78, âMinistry of Information: Organisationâ, probably November 1940.
[108] PRO INF 1/86, âOEPEC Paper No 572, Poster and Publicity Divisionâ, November 14 1940.
[109] Ibid., âMemo from Vaughan to DGâ, December 6 1940.
[110] Ibid., âMemo from Woodburn to Vaughanâ, January 29 1941.
[111] PRO INF 1/140, âRequest for Additional Staff for Campaigns Divisionâ, December 1941.
[112] PRO INF 1/638, See the variety in âContracts with Artists: War Artists and Illustrators. 24 November 1939 â October 1941â.
[113] PRO INF 1/86, âOEPEC Paper No 1951, General Production Division: Regrading of Staffâ, undated but probably January 1943.
[114] Ibid., âLetter from National Register of Industrial Designers to Embletonâ, May 13 1942 (with hand written notes by Embleton).
[115] Ibid., âMr Woodburn: Views on Staffingâ, January 1943.
[116] PRO INF 1/252, âMemo by Vaughanâ, November 12 1940.
[117] Freeman, J., âProfessional Organisations: Stricture or Structure for Graphic Design?â, in Bishop, T. (ed.), Design History: Fad or Function?, 1978, p.34.
[118] PRO INF 1/86, âGeneral Production Division, Staff and Functionsâ, August 26 1940.
[119] PRO INF 1/87, âMr Embleton to Mr Judd: Art Contracts outside the Ministryâ, March 29 1941.
[120] PRO MAF 39/05, âReport from the Select Committee on Estimates: Advertising and Publicity by Government Departmentsâ, [1938], p.3. The Admiralty employed artists known to and selected by themselves. The War Office allowed their agents to select artists. The National Fitness Council employed both a full time designer on staff and outside artists. The Post Office and the Ministry of Labour each selected artists from lists which they respectively maintained.
[121] PRO INF 1/302, âThe Functions and Methods of Home Publicityâ, October 17 1939.
[122] PRO INF 1/226, âLetter from Waterfield to Macadamâ, July 29 1939.
[123] PRO INF 1/849, âPolicy Committee: Lord Davidsonâs Proposalsâ, June 6 1940.
[124] PRO INF 1/637, âLetter from Bevan to Dame Laura Knightâ, October 21 1939.
[125] Ibid., âLetter from Bevan to Dame Laura Knightâ, October 31 1939.
[126] Ibid., âLetter from Dame Laura Knight to Bevanâ, November 2 1939.
[127] Ibid., âLetter from Bevan to Dame Laura Knightâ, November 28 1939.
[128] Ibid., âLetter from Bevan to Dame Laura Knightâ, December 2 1939.
[129] PRO INF 1/638, âLetter from Embleton, Studio Manager to Webb of the Braybrook Webb Studio, E.C.1â, December 13 1941.
[130] PRO INF 1/249, âPlanning Committee â Agenda and Minutesâ, October 2 1940.
[131] PRO INF 1/638, âLetter from Studio to Mr Werner of the War Artists and Illustratorsâ, undated.
[132] Ibid., âLetter from Director of War Artists and Illustrators to The War Officeâ, February 10 1941.
[133] Ibid., âLetter from R.H.J. Smallwood, War Artists and Illustrators to Chief Publicity Officer, Foreign Officeâ, July 9 1941.
[134] PRO INF 1/639, âLetter from G.W. Harrington to E.Embletonâ, undated but probably March 1942.
[135] Ibid., âLetter from E.Embleton to G.W. Harringtonâ, March 19 1942.
[136] Ibid., âLetter to Director of Production from G.W. Harringtonâ, February 4 1941.
[137] Haworth-Booth, M., E. McKnight Kauffer: a Designer and his Public, 1979, p.82. âEdward McKnight Kaufferâ, Poster Database, LTM, accessed February 2000, quoting Riddell, J., By Underground to Kew: London Transport Posters, 1908-Present, 1994, notes that Kauffer had designed posters for Mosleyâs British Union of Fascists. This fact may not have worked in his favour.
[138] Ibid., p.84.
[139] PRO INF 1/86, âSeries of Letters from Embletonâ, June 3 1942. The list comprised of H.G. Smith; C.W.Bacon; B. Chubb; J.W. Bird; F. Cramer; H.A. Seabright; Cuneo; F. Reeves; Laban; J.R. Brinkley; and H.E. Jones.
[140] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, May 11 1939.
[141] PRO INF 1/712, âPublicity: Sub-Committee Proceedings, July â September 1938â, undated.
[142] PRO INF 1/343, âPostersâ, October 31 1939.
[143] PRO INF 1/849, âPolicy Committee: Lord Davidsonâs Proposalsâ, June 6 1940.
[144] PRO INF 1/226, âProduction and Printing Reportâ, undated but likely to be summer 1939.
[145] PRO INF 1/238, âMemo from M.L.G. Balfour to Mr Bamfordâ, May 3 1940.
[146] Ibid., âMOI Memo on Paper Requirementsâ, May 27 1940.
[147] PRO INF 1/226, âMeeting, The Civil Service Commissionâ, June 27 1939.
[148] PRO INF 1/238, âLetter from MB to Mr Wiltshireâ, December 6 1941.
[149] Ibid., âPaper Ration for Ministry of Informationâ, May 7 1940.
[150] Ibid., âMemo from Mr Judd to Mr Vaughanâ, September 16 1941.
[151] Ibid., âLetter to DDGâ, undated.
[152] PRO INF 1/226, âProduction and Printing Reportâ, undated but likely to be summer 1939.
[153] PRO INF 1/343, âFood Publicityâ, November 2 1939.
[154] PRO INF 1/238, âLetter from Vaughan to Waterfieldâ, June 28 1940.
[155] PRO INF 1/249, âPlanning Committee â Agenda & Minutesâ, January 30 1941. See also PRO INF 1/251, âW.G.V. Vaughan: Home Planning Committee: Ministry of Information Billposting Campaignâ, December 17 1940. A similar point is made in PRO INF 1/249, âPlanning Committee â Agenda & Minutesâ, October 23 1940.
[156] Anonymous, â4-Sheet Deadline is Bad Business - says Poster Tradeâ Advertiserâs Weekly, September 4 1941, Vol. 113, No. 1,476, p.179.
[157] PRO INF 1/238, âLetter from G.W. Barley, Glasgow to MOIâ, April 10 1943.
[158] Ibid., âMemo from Miss de Mouilpied, Films Division to Miss Maxwellâ, November 19 1941.
[159] PRO INF 1/33, âNote attached to memo from Vaughan to Woodburnâ, 1 November 1939.
[160] PRO INF 1/86, âGeneral Production Division, Staff and Functionsâ, August 26 1940.
[161] PRO INF 1/306, âDraft Guide for Local Information Committeesâ, January 10 1941.
[162] PRO INF 1/533, âPlanning Committee on Home Moraleâ, May 27 1940.
[163] PRO INF 1/306, âDraft Guide for Local Information Committeesâ, January 10 1941.
[164] PRO INF 1/299, âSecret: Ministry of Information O.E.P.E.C., Paper No. 39â, undated but early 1939.
[165] PRO INF 1/533, âMemorandum on the Home Frontâ, undated but early war.
[166] PRO INF 1/341, âMemo to Mr Bamford from Mr Vaughanâ, November 19 1939, p.3.
[167] Ibid., These were C. Vernon & Son Ltd; Pritchard Wood & Partners Ltd., Mather & Crowther Ltd., C.F. Higham Ltd., Dorland Advertising Ltd., Alfred Pemberton Ltd.
[168] Ibid., These were Saward Baker Ltd., G.S. Royds Ltd., T.B. Browne Ltd., C. Mitchell Ltd.
[169] Ibid., p.1.
[170] Ibid., p.2.
[171] Ibid., p.4.
[172] PRO INF 1/250, âMinutes of Meeting: Planning Committeeâ, September 2 1940.
[173] PRO INF 1/341, âMinutes from the Thirteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Appointment of Advertising Agentsâ, July 18 1941.
[174] PRO INF 1/344, âLetter from Saward, Baker & Co. (Mr Galliano) to Mr Hornsby, MOIâ, June 6 1942.
[175] Female, West Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998.
[176] Male, Glasgow, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
[177] Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1991, p.7.
[178] PRO INF 1/73, âFrancis Williams: Theme for Propagandaâ, undated but probably 1941.
[179] PRO INF 1/299, âMinistry of Information O.E.P.E.C., Paper No. 10â, September 7 1938, p.1.
[180] Ibid., p.3.
[181] Noted in Cruickshank, C., op.cit., 1977, p.16.
[182] PRO INF 1/300 follows the development of the first wartime posters from at least April 13 1939.
[183] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, June 8 1939.
[184] Ibid., â3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, April 20 1939.
[185] Ibid., âImmediate Programme of Home Publicity Measuresâ, April 13 1939.
[186] Ibid., â3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, April 20 1939.
[187] Ibid., âImmediate Programme of Home Publicity Measuresâ, April 13 1939.
[188] PRO INF 1/226, âMeeting, The Civil Service Commissionâ, June 27 1939.
[189] Matless, D., Landscape and Englishness, 1998, p.185.
[190] PRO INF 1/720, âImmediate Programme of Home Publicity Measuresâ, April 13 1939
[191] Ibid., âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, May 4 1939.
[192] Ibid., May 16 1939.
[193] Ibid., âImmediate Programme of Home Publicity Measuresâ, April 13 1939.
[194] Ibid., âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, May 4 1939.
[195] PRO INF 1/226, âLetter from Waterfield to Macadamâ, July 17 1939, (emphasis in original).
[196] PRO INF 1/720, âImmediate Programme of Home Publicity Measuresâ, April 13 1939.
[197] Ibid., â3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, April 20 1939.
[198] Ibid., âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, May 4 1939.
[199] PRO INF 1/299, âMinistry of Information O.E.P.E.C., Paper No. 10â, September 7 1938, p.4.
[200] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, June 29 1939.
[201] PRO INF 1/299, âMinistry of Information O.E.P.E.C., Paper No. 10â, September 7 1938, p.4.
[202] Ibid., Appendix B.
[203] Ibid., p.5.
[204] Ibid., Appendix B.
[205] Ibid., Appendix A.
[206] Ibid., âPoster Scheme Summaryâ.
[207] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, undated, but probably June-August 1939.
[208] Ibid., â3rd Meeting, Immediate Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, April 20 1939.
[209] Ibid., â12th Meeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, June 21 1939.
[210] PRO INF 1/299, âMinistry of Information O.E.P.E.C., Paper No. 10â, September 7 1938, p.1.
[211] Ibid., Poster Scheme Summary.
[212] PRO INF 1/720, âMeeting, Programme of Publicity Measuresâ, undated but probably June-August 1939.
[213] PRO INF 1/261, âMemorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red postersâ, October 1939.
[214] PRO INF 1/10, âFunctions and Organisation of the Ministry. Memorandum by E.B. Morganâ, early 1939.
[215] PRO INF 1/266, âMemo from Vaughan to Macadamâ, August 9 1939.
[216] PRO INF 1/226, âLetter from Macadam to W.G.V. Vaughanâ, August 23 1939. In the same folder, âDemand for Printing Slip for HMSOâ, August 31 1939, and âPoster Campaign: Distributionâ, November 1 1940, give details of the exact quantities ordered on August 31 1939, in a variety of sizes and in both broadside and upright versions, and where distributed. PRO INF 1/302, âSummary of Activities of Home Publicity Divisionâ, September 28 1939 notes that all sizes were included, from 20ft. by 10ft. down to 15â? x 10â?.
[217] PRO INF 1/226, âLetter from I.S.Macadam, MOI to E.Rowe-Dutton, Treasuryâ, September 4 1939.
[218] PRO INF 1/6, âFirst Report on the Activities of the Ministry of Information from September 3 to September 17 1939â, September 1939.
[219] PRO INF 1/302, âSummary of Activities of Home Publicity Divisionâ, September 28 1939.
[220] PRO INF 1/6, âProgress Reports 3 Sept.-11Dec. 1939â, PRO INF 1/226, âPrinting of Postersâ, PRO INF 1/261, âEmployment of Mass Observation and the British Institute for Public Opinionâ, M-O FR2, âGovernment Posters in Wartimeâ,October 1939, M-O TC 42 â âPostersâ, Boxes 1, 2 and 4 cover âYour Courage; PRO INF 1/6, op.cit., PRO INF 1/226, op.cit., INF 1/261, op.cit., Embleton Scrapbook No. 1 at the IWM, M-O FR 2, op.cit., October 1939; M-O FR 5, âSix Railway Posters â Preferences in Designâ, October 1939, cover âFreedom is in Perilâ; PRO INF 1/6, op.cit., PRO INF 2/95, âAnti-Gossip Campaignâ, M-O TC 42, Box 4/B cover âDonât Help the Enemyâ. See also M-O, Change No. 2, Home Propaganda, 1941.
[221] Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.57; Chapman, J., op.cit., 1998, p.18; McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.31; and Walton, R. âFour in Focusâ, in Timmers, M., The Power of the Poster, 1998, p.154, all refer to the âfailureâ of the first government poster, for various reasons.
[222] M-O FR 2, âGovernment Posters in Wartime: Effectiveness of Postersâ, October 18 1939, p.1.
[223] Ibid., p.2.
[224] Female, Hampshire, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
[225] Male, South Shields, reply to questionnaire, March 1998.
[226] Male, Buckinghamshire/London, reply to questionnaire, April 1998.
[227] Male, Devon, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. In hindsight, this respondent believed that âone could argue that the originator had, in fact, identified the three typically British qualities [courage; cheerfulness; resolution] which were to see us through the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.â
[228] (Untitled), Daily Mail, February 7 1940, Embleton Collection, IWM.
[229] PRO MH 78/232, âMinute Sheet initialled KMGâ, September 28 1939.
[230] Anonymous, âOne in Four of Public Remember Govt. Advertising Slogansâ, Advertiserâs Weekly, Vol. 107, No. 1,397, February 29 1940, p.156.
[231] PRO INF 1/261, âMemorandum on the report of Mass Observation upon the Red postersâ, October 1939.
[232] PRO, INF 1/300, âMinutes of meeting held on May 11 1939, of the Home Section of International Propaganda and Broadcasting Enquiryâ, May 16 1939, p.8.
[233] Press Advertising and the Trade, September 1939 - September 1940, p.35, noted that this was probably a result of the arguments between Fleet Street and the MOI.
[234] 351 H.C. DEB. 5s., October 3 1939, Column 1841.
[235] Anonymous, âM. of I.âs Poster Scheme, through S.H. Bensonâs, will cost £44,000. âDaily Expressâ? thinks money would be better spent on arms equipmentâ, Advertiserâs Weekly, Vol. 105, No. 1,377, October 12 1939, p.26 (emphasis in original).
[236] Anonymous, âThey Sayâ, Advertiserâs Weekly, Vol. 105, No. 1,378, October 19 1939, p.44.
[237] Anonymous, âOn the Home Frontâ, Advertiserâs Weekly, Vol. 110, No. 1,438, October 3 1940, p.14.
[238] M-O, Change No. 2, Home Propaganda, 1941, p.5.
[239] Anonymous, âDue Credit to M. of I. For Postersâ, Advertiserâs Weekly, Vol. 105, No. 1,377, October 12 1939, p.34, quoting letter to The Times.
[240] PRO INF 1/6, âThird Report on the MOI, September 25 âOctober 2 1939â, October 1939.
[241] Weight, R. & Beach, A., The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960, 1998, p.1.
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